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“I EXPECTED IT TO HAPPEN/I KNEW HE’D LOST CONTROL”:  
THE IMPACT OF PTSD ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING AFTER THE 
PROMULGATION OF DSM-5 
 
Michael L. Perlin* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
To a significant extent, this Article flows from my experiences as a public 
defender and mental health advocate in the 1970s and 1980s. I first was a rookie 
public defender in Trenton, New Jersey (1971–74), where, by coincidence, the 
state’s maximum-security institution for the “criminally insane,” the mellifluously-
named Vroom Building, was located. In addition to the typical felony caseload, I 
also represented people at that institution in both individual and class actions.1 
During those years, the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) second 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-II”) prevailed.2 I then 
spent eight years as director of the New Jersey Division of Mental Health Advocacy 
(DMHA) (1974–82), the first state-wide, state-funded public interest law office 
tasked with the representation of persons facing commitment to hospitals, seeking 
release, or complaining about their conditions of confinement.3 During these years, 
the next DSM volume, the DSM-III, was used.4 I have now been teaching and 
writing about mental disability law and criminal procedure for over thirty years. And 
during this time, we have gone from DSM-III to DSM-IV to DSM-IVR to, now, 
DSM-5.5 
In my days as a public defender, and in my representation of individual clients 
in the DMHA at commitment and periodic review hearings, everyone referred to the 
DSM frequently, but solely as a characterization tool by expert witnesses (“Your 
                                                     
*© 2015 Michael L. Perlin. Perlin is Professor Emeritus of Law and the Founding 
Director of the International Mental Disability Law Reform Project at New York Law 
School. He wishes to thank Katherine Davies for her invaluable help, David Wexler and 
Alison Lynch for their incisive comments, and the participants at the University of 
Pennsylvania Forensic Psychiatry Workshop Seminar for their insightful contributions. 
1 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy by a Public Advocate, 54 
PSYCHIATRIC Q. 169, 169, 173–74 (1982) [hereinafter Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy]. 
2 See, e.g., 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 
2A-3.1, at 64 n.130 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW] 
(discussing the full history of the DSM). The term “mental disability” subsumes both mental 
illness and intellectual disability. I use “mental disability” wherever I can, but I sometimes 
use the term “mental illness” when I am referring to the usage in a case or statute. 
3 See, e.g., Stanley C. Van Ness & Michael L. Perlin, Mental Health Advocacy: The 
New Jersey Experience, in MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY: AN EMERGING FORCE IN 
CONSUMERS’ RIGHTS 62, 62 (Louis E. Kopolow & Helene Bloom eds., 1977). 
4 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 2A-3.1, at 64 n.130. 
5 Id. at 66 n.132. 
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honor, I have diagnosed the patient as having [name of condition], defined in DSM 
as [listing criteria]”). I represented many criminal defendants who served in 
Vietnam, but no one uttered the phrase “Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder” (PTSD). 
Occasionally, in the case of a DMHA client, someone would say to me—when I was 
visiting my clients on hospital wards—“The war made him crazy.” But I cannot 
recall the phrase PTSD, or even as it was often called then, “Vietnam Stress 
Syndrome,” ever being uttered. 
But I had a very different experience in the DMHA when we began to 
investigate conditions, pursuant to our statutory grant of power to do affirmative 
class action and law reform cases, at Lyons VA Hospital in New Jersey. At Lyons 
we investigated clients’ complaints about their treatment there, and what we found 
was this: there appeared to be a profound difference between the way World War II 
veterans and Korean War veterans were treated and, on the other hand, the way 
Vietnam War veterans were treated. These differences were also apparent in the 
ways these two cohorts responded to their treatment and, simply, being 
hospitalized.6 The first group appeared, by and large, to be grateful to the VA for 
providing any services at all. The second group, the Vietnam veterans, were angry—
angry at being in the hospital, and angry at the way they were being treated, 
especially as compared to the first cohort. Here, for the first time, I came across 
PTSD diagnoses.7 
After I became a professor, although I ran a live-client clinic for six years and 
an out-placement clinic (called a “workshop”) for about ten, I basically stopped 
otherwise representing individual and class clients, and I turned my attention to 
teaching and writing. In 1989, I published a three-volume treatise on Mental 
Disability Law, and by 2002, I had expanded that into a five-volume second edition.8 
And in this treatise, in the unit on the insanity defense, I included a section on 
Vietnam Stress Syndrome, in which I had discussed PTSD.9 There was also a 
chapter on sentencing, but I did not include that syndrome or PTSD in general in 
that discussion.10  
  
                                                     
6 See Michael L. Perlin, “John Brown Went Off to War”: Considering Veterans’ Courts 
as Problem-Solving Courts, 37 NOVA L. REV. 445, 447 (2013) [hereinafter Perlin, John 
Brown Went Off to War]. 
7 I discuss this litigation (Falter v. Veterans Admin., 502 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1980)) 
and its implications in Michael L. Perlin & John Douard, “Equality, I Spoke That Word/As 
If a Wedding Vow”: Mental Disability Law and How We Treat Marginalized Persons, 53 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 10–14 (2008–09). 
8 I am now, with Professor Heather Ellis Cucolo, at work on a third edition that was 
submitted to the publisher in May 2015. 
9 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 9A-9.3b, at 271–74. 
10 See generally id. § 11-1 to -4.5 (discussing mental disability at and after sentencing). 
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I update the treatise annually and always note a few new reported cases dealing 
with this issue,11 but until two years ago, that was pretty much it. Then, in January 
2013, I wrote an article about veterans courts—a new sort of problem-solving 
court—now growing exponentially.12 I have been writing about mental health courts 
regularly,13 but this was the first time I turned my attention to these courts. And my 
research for that article led me to confront, for the first time, the incidence of PTSD 
among veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The numbers were appalling. 
Already, between 10% and 20% of all veterans returning from the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan exhibit characteristics of PTSD, and estimates of the percentage of 
those who have sought treatment for this condition range from 23% to 40%.14 
In short, PTSD has become a much more important issue in the law, especially 
in the context of that generation significantly likely to commit crimes and 
                                                     
11 See, e.g., 4 MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY 
LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 9A-93b, at 110 n.940 (2d ed. Supp. 2014) [hereinafter PERLIN 
& CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW] (discussing State v. Bottrell, 14 P.3d 164, 166 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2000), in which the court reversed a conviction for first degree murder because the 
court failed to admit evidence of PTSD while affirming a conviction for felony murder on 
other grounds); id. § 12-3.7, at 156 (discussing Johnson v. Luebbers, 532 U.S. 934 (2001)); 
see also James R. Johnson, CLARK CNTY. IND. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, 
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/johnson750.htm, archived at http://perma. 
cc/EC88-HV55 (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (discussing James R. Johnson, the defendant and 
a Vietnam War veteran, who unsuccessfully alleged ineffective assistance of counsel on 
appeal for failure to interview prosecution witnesses and present accurate evidence in support 
of his PTSD defense). 
12 See Perlin, John Brown Went Off to War, supra note 6, at 457. There are over two 
hundred such courts in existence now and several hundred in the planning stage. See, e.g., 
William H. McMichael, The Battle on the Home Front, 97 A.B.A. J. 42, 44 (2011) 
(discussing veterans treatment courts like in Buffalo, New York, that address the needs of 
troubled veterans); The History, JUSTICE FOR VETS, http://www.justiceforvets.org/vtc-
history, archived at http://perma.cc/HS34-6WJK (last visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
13 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “The Judge, He Cast His Robe Aside”: Mental Health 
Courts, Dignity and Due Process, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL’Y J. 1, 1–5 (2013) 
[hereinafter Perlin, His Robe]; Michael Perlin, “There Are No Trials Inside the Gates of 
Eden”: Mental Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
Dignity, and the Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in COERCIVE CARE: RIGHTS, LAW 
AND POLICY 193 (Bernadette McSherry & Ian Freckelton eds., 2013) [hereinafter Perlin, 
Gates of Eden]. 
14 See, e.g., F. Don Nidiffer & Spencer Leach, To Hell and Back: Evolution of Combat-
Related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, 29 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 11–12 (2010) 
(providing percentages exhibiting PTSD); Cathy Ho Hartsfield, Note, Deportation of 
Veterans: The Silent Battle for Naturalization, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 835, 851 (2012) 
(providing percentages seeking treatment). See generally Perlin, John Brown Went Off to 
War, supra note 6, at 461–63 (discussing PTSD and veterans courts as problem-solving 
courts). 
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subsequently to be sentenced.15 The significance of this reality is heightened further 
by the APA’s adoption of the new DSM-5, which greatly expands the definition of 
PTSD and raises multiple questions that need to be considered carefully by lawyers, 
mental health professionals, advocates and policy makers.16 
My thesis is that the expansion of the PTSD criteria in DSM-517  has the 
potential to make significant changes in legal practice in all aspects of criminal 
procedure, but none more so than in criminal sentencing.18 I believe that if courts 
treat DSM-5 with the same deference with which they have treated earlier versions 
                                                     
15 Approximately 40% of all felony defendants are typically arrested between the ages 
of twenty-five and thirty-nine. See THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN 
COUNTIES, 2006, at 4 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/JC2U-E24X. 
16 See infra text accompanying notes 182–190. Although this Article is limited to issues 
involving the criminal justice system, the changed diagnostic definition of PTSD also has 
vast potential implications for other areas of the law, including, but not limited to, 
correctional and asylum law, disability law, employment law and tort litigation based on 
emotional distress. See Andrew P. Levin et al., DSM-5 and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 
42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 146, 154–56 (2014). These topics are beyond the scope 
of this Article. Also beyond the scope of this Article are PTSD cases in the criminal law 
context in which the disorder arises from other external behaviors (e.g., domestic violence, 
observation of domestic violence, or providing legal or mental health services to trauma 
victims). See, e.g., Jennifer Brobst, The Impact of Secondary Traumatic Stress Among 
Family Attorneys Working with Trauma-Exposed Clients: Implications for Practice and 
Professional Responsibility, 10 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 2 (2014); Richard Famularo 
et al., Child Maltreatment and the Development of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 147 AM. 
J. DISEASES CHILD. 755 (1993); Evan R. Seamone, Sex Crimes Litigation as Hazardous 
Duty: Practical Tools for Trauma-Exposed Prosecutors, Defense Counsel, and Paralegals, 
11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487, 487–88 (2014). 
17  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 271–80 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5]. See 
generally Levin et al., supra note 16 (discussing the expansion of PTSD in the DSM). The 
authors of DSM-5 note this manual is not a resource designed to meet “all the technical needs 
of the legal system.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra; see also Cheryl D. Wills & 
Liza H. Gold, Introduction to the Special Section on DSM-5 and Forensic Psychiatry, 42 J. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 132, 133 (2013) (acknowledging that the “DSM-5 is not a 
resource designed to meet ‘all of the technical needs’ of the legal system” (citation omitted)). 
18 On its potential impact on other areas of criminal law practice, see, for example, Kate 
Janse van Rensburg, The DSM-5 and Its Potential Effects on Atkins v. Virginia, 3 MENTAL 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y J. 61, 100 (2013), and Levin et al., supra note 16. For a list of pre-2012 
cases in which PTSD was offered as a criminal defense, and specifically where PTSD was 
used in cases involving the unconsciousness defense, self-defense, and to refute mens rea, 
see Omri Berger et al., PTSD as a Criminal Defense: A Review of Case Law, 40 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 509, 511, 515, 517 (2012). 
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of that Manual,19 it will force them to seriously confront—in a wide variety of 
cases—the impact of PTSD on sentencing decisions. And this, I believe, might lead 
to more robust debates over the impact of mental disability generally on sentencing 
outcomes.  
It is necessary to consider all of this in the context of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (“Guidelines”) and the Supreme Court’s interpretations of those 
Guidelines. As I discuss below,20 the Supreme Court, in Mistretta v. United States,21 
held that those Guidelines—a series of grids listing, inter alia, specific aggravating 
and mitigating factors, 22  and using a mathematical calculation to arrive at the 
presumptive sentence23—were mandatory.24 Sixteen years later, in United States v. 
Booker,25 the Court modified Mistretta by making the Guidelines advisory, not 
mandatory.26 In the aftermath of Booker, some courts appeared more receptive to 
                                                     
19 Expert witnesses regularly have referred to earlier versions of DSM, for diagnostic 
purposes, as the “gold standard.” See, e.g., Castaldi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 
09-300V, 2014 WL 3749749, at *9 (Fed. Cl. June 25, 2014) aff’d sub nom. Castaldi v. Sec’y 
of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-300V, 2014 WL 7475228 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 19, 
2014); Hokkanen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 03-1753V, 2009 WL 4857386, at 
*10 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 1, 2009); People v. Crosby, No. 5-10-0224, 2011 IL App (5th) 100224-
U, at *3, *5 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). Or, instead of the “gold standard,” it has also been referred 
to as the “bible.” See, e.g., United States v. Liu, 267 F. Supp. 2d 371, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(noting that the DSM-IV is “the psychiatric profession’s diagnostic bible.” (quoting United 
States v. Harris, No. S192 Cr. 455(CSH), 1994 WL 683429 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1994)) aff’d, 
79 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 1996). But see Wills & Gold, supra note 17, at 133 (“The DSM is often 
mischaracterized in court and by the popular press as the Bible of mental health 
professionals.”). 
20 See infra text accompanying notes 21–28. 
21 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). 
22 On mental disability as a potential mitigator, see infra notes 120–124. 
23 See, e.g., Keri A. Gould, Turning Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged, Dismissed, or 
Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Promote Respect for the Law?, 10 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 835, 836 n.7, 850 (1993); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing 
Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 
883, 941 n.303 (1990). 
24 Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367–68. 
25 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
26 Id. at 233 (2005) (noting that the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory); Michael 
L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “In the Wasteland of Your Mind”: Criminology, Scientific 
Discoveries and the Criminal Process 4 (Nov. 21, 2014) (paper presented at the American 
Society of Criminology annual conference) (on file with Utah Law Review). See generally 
PERLIN & CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 11, § 11-2.2, at 144–45 (noting 
that the Court’s ruling in Booker required that the Federal Sentencing Act’s provision, 
making the sentencing guidelines “mandatory,” must be severed). According to Federal 
Judge Mark W. Bennett, “Booker clearly gave federal sentencing judges more discretion, but 
not much clarity . . . .” Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and 
“Blind Spot” Biases In Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a 
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mental disability evidence at this stage.27 But the best evidence is that a significant 
number of federal judges have backpedalled away from Booker in dramatic fashion, 
making sentencing decisions as if they were still under the thrall of Mistretta v. 
United States.28 This is troubling on many levels, not the least of which is the courts’ 
sorry history of ignoring or misusing mental disability under the Guidelines, and in 
some instances, using it as an aggravating rather than mitigating factor.29 
My optimism is tempered by one additional reality: the teleological ways courts 
deal with mental disability evidence in general, subordinating it when it is introduced 
by the defendant, and privileging it when introduced by the state,30 a device that 
parallels courts’ treatment of Daubert evidence, 31  disproportionately granting 
                                                     
Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 514 (2014). I discuss Booker more 
fully infra in text accompanying notes 94–106. 
27 See, e.g., United States v. MacKinnon, 401 F.3d 8, 9–11 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that 
a remand is warranted where, in light of Booker, the court denied defendant’s request for 
downward departure based on mental illness because the judge felt the sentencing guidelines 
allowed no departure); United States v. Pallowick, 364 F. Supp. 2d 923, 926–30 (E.D. Wis. 
2005) (ruling a non-Guidelines sentence was appropriate in light of Booker having made 
Guidelines advisory). See generally Summary U.S. Supreme Court Actions, MENTAL & 
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP., Jan./Feb. 2005, at 137, 137 [hereinafter Supreme Court 
Summary] (discussing the capabilities of jurors and judges to consider evidence of mental 
disabilities in sentencing). 
28 See, e.g., Alison Siegler, Rebellion: The Courts of Appeals’ Latest Anti-Booker 
Backlash, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 201–03 (2015) (“Since Booker, the circuit courts—abetted 
by the DOJ—have repeatedly rebelled against the Supreme Court by overpolicing below-
Guidelines sentences and underpolicing within-Guidelines sentences.”). Judge Bennett 
argues in a recent article that sentences are “subconsciously anchored” by the Guidelines 
range. Bennett, supra note 26, at 490. 
29 See generally Michael L. Perlin & Keri K. Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: 
Mental Disability and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 431, 433–36, 
441–44 (1995) (discussing the inconsistency of courts in considering mental disability under 
the sentencing guidelines); Ellen Fels Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating 
Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 291–92 (1989) (discussing 
aggravating and mitigating factors in sentencing, and noting that aggravating factors “may 
be the result of a defendant’s mental illness”). 
30 See Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror”: The Legal Profession’s 
Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 
599–600 (2008) [hereinafter Perlin, Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror] (citing JOHN Q. LA 
FOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 
AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 156 (1992)) (“Judges’ refusals to consider the meaning 
and realities of mental illness cause them to act in what appears, at first blush, to be 
contradictory and inconsistent ways, and teleologically, to privilege (where that privileging 
serves what they perceive as a socially-beneficial value) and subordinate (where that 
subordination serves what they perceive as a similar value) evidence of mental illness.”). 
31 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579–80 (1993) (holding that 
jurors may hear evidence and weigh facts from experts whose testimony included novel 
scientific theories, if the case warranted—even if those theories had not gained “general 
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Daubert motions when offered by the state and disproportionately denying them 
when offered by criminal defendants.32 It is also necessary to consider the courts’ 
unfortunate tradition of pretextuality in cases involving defendants with mental 
disabilities.33 This reality must be kept in mind as well.  
It is also important to consider the power of sanism in this entire inquiry. 
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as other irrational 
prejudices that cause, and are reflected in, prevailing social attitudes such as racism, 
sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry.34 Sanism’s corrosive effects have warped 
                                                     
acceptance” in the scientific community—as long as the testimony was “relevant” and 
“reliable”). There is no question that the PTSD diagnosis meets the Daubert standards. See 
Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, The Law and the Brain: Judging Scientific 
Evidence of Intent, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 243, 270–274 (1999); Berger et al., supra 
note 18, at 510. On the potential interplay between Daubert and the DSM-5 in the context of 
cases involving defendants with developmental disabilities potentially facing the death 
penalty, see van Rensburg, supra note 17, at 91 (noting the DSM’s increasing presence “in 
the courtroom is likely due” to Daubert). 
32 See D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of 
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 105-08 (2000). In sixty-seven cases 
of challenged government expertise, the prosecution prevailed in sixty-one of these. Id. at 
105. Out of fifty-four complaints by criminal defendants that their expertise was improperly 
excluded, the defendant lost in forty-four of these. Id. at 106. Contrarily, in civil cases, 90% 
of Daubert appeals were by the defendants, who prevailed two-thirds of the time. Id. at 108. 
For a thoughtful analysis of Professor Risinger’s findings, see Déirdre Dwyer, (Why) Are 
Civil and Criminal Expert Evidence Different?, 43 TULSA L. REV. 381, 382–84 (2007). 
Professor Susan D. Rozelle is blunter: “The game of scientific evidence looks fixed.” Susan 
D. Rozelle, Daubert, Schmaubert: Criminal Defendants and the Short End of the Science 
Stick, 43 TULSA L. REV. 597, 598 (2007). I discuss this, inter alia, in Michael L. Perlin, “His 
Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great Skill”: How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging 
Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 906–07, 907 n.139 (2009) 
[hereinafter Perlin, His Brain]. 
33 “Pretextuality” means that “courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial 
dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision-
making,” specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a high propensity 
“to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends.” Michael L. Perlin, 
“Simplify You, Classify You”: Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil Rights in Disability 
Classification Systems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 621 (2009); accord Michael L. Perlin, 
Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of “Ordinary Common Sense,” Heuristic 
Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 
(1991); Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 627 n.3 (1993); Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “All His Sexless 
Patients”: Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 257, 272 n.62 (2014). 
34 Perlin & Lynch, supra note 33, at 259. See generally Michael L. Perlin, “Half-
Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental 
Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 3–4 (1999) (discussing 
how sanism permeates all mental disability law). On the way that sanism affects lawyers’ 
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all aspects of the criminal process, including that of sentencing.35 We must keep this 
in mind when we approach this issue. 
Finally, notwithstanding the pessimism that I have already expressed, we must 
also consider the impact of therapeutic jurisprudence on the question at hand. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) presents a new model for assessing the impact of 
case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law that can 
have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.36 Although some scholars have 
considered TJ in the context of the Guidelines,37 it remains mostly an under-the-
radar topic.38 As I explore below, it is essential we give TJ a new and urgent focus.  
I am convinced that, if courts take seriously the new treatment of PTSD in 
DSM-5, and couple that with an understanding of sanism and an application of TJ, 
it will lead to an important change in the ways that defendants with that condition—
especially those who are veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—are 
sentenced. My Article will proceed in this way. First, I will review the law of 
sentencing as it relates to persons with disabilities, focusing on pre- and post-Booker 
developments and the role of sanism. Then, I will look at how courts have variably, 
until this moment, treated PTSD in sentencing decisions. I will then look at DSM-5 
to highlight its definitional changes. I will then discuss TJ and try to “connect the 
dots” to show how DSM-5 demands changes in sentencing practices, and I will 
explain how this change can be consonant with the principles of TJ. I will end with 
some modest conclusions, urging lawyers representing the population in question 
and judges to take seriously the issues raised here. 
My title draws on a lyric from Bob Dylan’s remarkable song, Stuck Inside of 
Mobile with the Memphis Blue Again, best known for its chorus line, “Oh, mama, 
                                                     
representation of clients, see Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: 
Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 689–90 (2003). 
35 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, 
My Trial”: Global Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment 
Cases, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 259 (2008). 
36 See Michael L. Perlin & Alison Lynch, “Toiling in the Danger and in the Morals of 
Despair”: Risk, Security, Danger, the Constitution, and the Clinician’s Dilemma, 27 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 48–52) (on file with Utah Law Review); 
see also Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 
in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91, 91–92 (Ian Freckelton & Kerry Peterson 
eds., 2006) (for a transnational perspective). See generally infra text accompanying notes 
191–208. 
37 See, e.g., Heather Ellis Cucolo, Hebephilia and Pedohebephilia: Implications for 
Law and Policy, 12 SEX OFFENDER L. REP. 55, 55–56 (2011) (examining the debate over 
hebephilia and arguing that its integration into the DSM will change the “legal lens through 
which such designations may be viewed,” including by vilifying homosexual males who 
have a strong interest in post-pubescent teenagers); Gould, supra note 23, at 842–53 
(analyzing the guidelines through a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective). 
38  I address this issue preliminarily in MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR 
DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 210–12 (2013) 
[hereinafter PERLIN, PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY]. 
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can this really be the end.”39 Michael Gray, one of the great Dylan historians, 
concludes this song demonstrates “hope and despondency, potential and restraint.”40 
The lines preceding the ones I use are these: “[H]e built a fire on Main Street/And 
shot it full of holes.”41 To a great extent, some of the actions of veterans with PTSD 
appear as pointless to the onlooker as the crime described by Dylan. Given what we 
know about the impact of PTSD, society should not at all be surprised by the events 
I discuss in this Article, for we certainly should have “expected it to happen,” 
“[knowing the defendant had] lost control.”42 I write this Article in hopes that this 
(the current state of affairs) is “really” not “the end.”43 
 
II.  MENTAL DISABILITY AND SENTENCING44 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
Remarkably little has been written about the impact of mental disability on the 
sentencing process.45 Intuitively, this is surprising as the percentage of sentenced 
defendants with some sort of mental disability is significant.46 But, for whatever 
reason, this issue appears to be under the radar for most scholars writing about the 
relationship between mental disability and sentencing decision-making. 
                                                     
39  Stuck Inside of Mobile with the Memphis Blues Again, BOBDYLAN.COM, 
http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/stuck-inside-mobile-memphis-blues-again, archived at 
http://perma.cc/T9QN-RXDM (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Stuck Inside of 
Mobile]. 
40 MICHAEL GRAY, THE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 644 (2006). 
41 Stuck Inside of Mobile, supra note 39. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 This section is generally adapted from PERLIN & CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, 
supra note 11, §§ 11-2 to 11-2.1, at 441–58. 
45  But see ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND 
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 71–73 (1985) (identifying a range of 
factors, including the actor’s mental state in an assessment of culpability, both his motives 
and any significant mental disability, and the presence of mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances such as necessity or duress). 
46 See, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Mental Health and the Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 315, 319 (2004) (as many as one-third of prisoners have mental disabilities). The 
percentage of prisoners in state high security or segregated units ranges from 23% to 50%. 
See SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL EQUIPPED: U.S. 
PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 147–49 (2003), available at http:// 
www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3ADU-
UD93; Jamie Fellner, A Corrections Quandary: Mental Illness and Prison Rules, 41 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 392 (2006). See generally Christina Canales, Note, Prisons: The New 
Mental Health System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1725 (2012) (discussing the movement of persons 
with mental disabilities from state hospitals to community-based programs and the gap 
prisons fill in this process). 
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Before I turn to an analysis of the impact of DSM-5 on sentencing in the context 
of persons with PTSD (or asserting PTSD claims), I will briefly review the impact 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the significance of subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting the Guidelines, and the impact of sanism and these cases on 
litigation involving defendants with serious mental disabilities. 
 
B.  Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Early Years47 
 
In response to criticisms of indeterminate sentencing,48 Congress49 passed the 
1984 Sentencing Reform Act50 in an attempt to bring about a measure of regularity 
and uniformity in federal sentencing procedures. Under this law, a Sentencing 
Commission was created 51  and was mandated to promulgate Guidelines in 
accordance with the Act.52 The constitutionality of these Guidelines—a binding set 
of rules that courts must use in imposing sentences53—was initially upheld by the 
Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States.54 
                                                     
47 See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY 
ON TRIAL 245–58, 287–88 (2000) [hereinafter PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE] (discussing 
mental disability and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); PERLIN & CUCOLO, MENTAL 
DISABILITY LAW, supra note 11, § 11-2.2, at 145 (discussing early courts’ application of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines); Perlin & Gould, supra note 29, at 431–33, 436–40 
(discussing mental disability and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). 
48 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 361, 374, 379 (1989) (discussing 
sentencing disparities). 
49  Some states similarly adopted determinate sentencing laws. See, e.g., State v. 
Sepulvado, 655 So. 2d 623 (La. Ct. App. 1995), writ denied, 662 So. 2d 465 (La. 1995) 
(upward departure not excessive); State v. Allert, 815 P.2d 752 (Wash. 1991) (combination 
of depression, personality disorder, and alcoholism did not justify exceptional sentence). For 
a careful opinion considering the appropriate scope of discretion in such cases, see People v. 
Watters, 595 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 473 (Ill. 1992). 
For a representative opinion from a non-Guidelines state, see e.g., State v. Chase in Winter, 
534 N.W.2d 350 (S.D. 1995) (200-year sentence of mentally ill defendant not cruel and 
unusual punishment). 
50 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2011 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (1988)). See generally Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not 
Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833 (1992) (reviewing Judge Heaney’s criticisms and 
proposed solutions of the sentencing process). 
51 See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988). 
52 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (2012). 
53 See id. Under the Act, a series of permissible sentencing ranges is created for each 
federal criminal offense. See id. § 994(b)(2). 
54 488 U.S. 361 (1989). See generally Ira Bloom, The Aftermath of Mistretta: The 
Demonstrated Incompatibility of the United States Sentencing Commission and Separation 
of Powers Principles, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 1–5 (1996) (explaining the court’s decision and 
constitutionality from the case); Frank O. Bowman, The Quality of Mercy Must Be 
Restrained, and Other Lessons in Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 
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Under the Guidelines, a sentencing court initially was allowed to depart from 
the prescribed ranges where “the defendant committed a non-violent offense55 while 
suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity56 not resulting from voluntary 
                                                     
WIS. L. REV. 679, 690 (explaining how Congress was able to create guidelines that the 
Supreme Court validated); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 906–13 (1990) 
(explaining the difficult constitutional challenges of Mistretta). 
55 On the meaning of “non-violent offense,” see, for example, Chambers v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009) (failure to report a crime is not a violent felony); Begay v. 
United States, 553 U.S. 137, 148 (2008) (driving under the influence a nonviolent crime); 
United States v. Jones, 752 F.3d 1039, 1043 (5th Cir. 2014) (escaping from a halfway house 
is not a crime of violence); United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 507 (4th Cir. 2013), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1326 (2014) (assault and battery of a police officer is not a “crime of 
violence”); United States v. Coronado, 603 F.3d 706, 708 (9th Cir. 2010) (grossly and 
negligently discharging a firearm is not a “crime of violence”); United States v. Gomez-
Leon, 545 F.3d 777, 795 (9th Cir. 2008) (vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated without 
gross negligence is not a “crime of violence”); United States v. Clements, 144 F.3d 981, 
983–84 (6th Cir. 1998) (extortion is a “crime of violence” under terms of the Guidelines); 
United States v. Shannon, 94 F.3d 1065, 1071 (7th Cir. 1996) (statutory rape is not a crime 
of violence); compare United States v. Anderson, 755 F.3d 782, 802 (5th Cir. 2014) (prior 
burglary is a “crime of violence”); United States v. Herrera-Alvarez, 753 F.3d 132, 136 (5th 
Cir. 2014) (crime of aggravated battery is a “crime of violence”); United States v. 
Hernandez-Galvan, 632 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2011) (attempted robbery is a crime of 
violence); United States v. Smith, 329 F. App’x 109, 111 (9th Cir. 2009) (sexual abuse of a 
minor is a crime of violence); United States v. Almenas, 553 F.3d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(resisting arrest is a crime of violence); United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 
2008) (transporting a minor for prostitution was a “violent crime”). 
56 On the question of whether a compulsive gambling disorder satisfies the Guidelines, 
see United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 792 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding the defendant’s 
compulsive gambling did not warrant downward departure), reh’g & reh’g en banc denied, 
abrogated by United States v. Askari, 159 F.3d 774 (3rd Cir. 1998); United States v. Carucci, 
33 F. Supp. 2d 302, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding compulsive gambling did not warrant 
downward departure in case of stockbroker who had pled guilty to unlawful securities trading 
practices); United States v. Katzenstein, No. 90 CR 272 (KMW), 1991 WL 24386, at *2–3 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1991) (stating unless the defendant could demonstrate that total 
rehabilitation had been achieved, it would be necessary for her to introduce evidence 
showing lack of correlation between compulsive gambling disorder and increased propensity 
for criminal activity); compare United States v. Liu, 267 F. Supp. 2d 371, 376–77 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003) (granting defendant a four-point downward departure for his gambling addiction 
because his addiction led to his crime); United States v. Checoura, 176 F. Supp. 2d 310, 316 
(D.N.J. 2001) (holding that a gambling disorder was considered diminished capacity and 
warranted a downward departure under the Guidelines); United States v. Martinez, 978 F. 
Supp. 1442, 1454 (D.N.M. 1997) (holding that a downward departure is appropriate in a case 
of a compulsive gambler convicted of robbery of an illegal casino operating on an Indian 
reservation). See generally Lawrence S. Lustberg, Sentencing the Sick: Compulsive 
Gambling as the Basis for a Downward Departure Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 51 (1992) (examining whether compulsive gambling is a proper 
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use of drugs or other intoxicants.” 57  In such cases, a lower sentence “may be 
warranted” to reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed to 
the commission of the offense, as long as “the defendant’s criminal history [does 
not] indicate[] a need to incarcerate the defendant to protect the public.”58 
 
In April 1998, the Guidelines were amended to read: 
 
[A sentence below the applicable guideline range] may be warranted if (1) 
the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly 
reduced mental capacity. . . However, the court may not depart below the 
applicable guideline range if (1) the significantly reduced mental capacity 
was caused by the voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants; (2) the facts 
and circumstances of the defendant’s offense indicate a need to protect the 
public because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of 
violence; [or] (3) the defendant’s criminal history indicates a need to 
incarcerate the defendant or protect the public . . . If a departure is 
                                                     
basis for a downward departure under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). See supra text 
accompanying note 56 (determining that gambling dependence statutorily eliminated as a 
potential grounds for downward departures). 
57 Clements, 144 F.3d at 982; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5k2.13 
(2011) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL]; see, e.g., United States v. Parris, 
741 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that alcoholism forbids basis for downward sentencing 
departure); United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 759–60 (4th Cir. 1996) (same); United 
States v. Watson, 385 F. Supp. 2d 534, 540 (E.D. Pa. 2005), aff’d, 482 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 
2007) (holding that mental health, cognitive limitations, or substance addiction were not 
grounds for a downward departure); United States v. Webb, 134 F.3d 403, 409 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (holding that drug addiction could not form basis for downward departure); United 
States v. Hunter, 980 F. Supp. 1439, 1451 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (same), aff’d, 172 F.3d 1307 
(1999); cf. United States v. Cani, 545 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1243 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (stating that 
drug addiction cannot be used as a downward departure under the Guidelines, but can be 
considered when looking at other factors, such as history and characteristics of the defendant, 
when determining the sentence). 
58 SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, § 5k2.13, at 477; Kirk D. Houser, 
Comment, Downward Departures: The Lower Envelope of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 361, 374 (1993). See generally Donald C. Wayne, Case 
Comment, Chaotic Sentencing: Downward Departures Based on Extraordinary Family 
Circumstances, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 443, 444 (1993) (finding that a single parent has more 
need to be home than locked up in a facility for an extended time). For relevant early cases, 
see, for example, United States v. Mitchell, 113 F.3d 1528, 1536 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that downward departure could be warranted if it is not needed to protect the public), reh’g 
denied (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1063 (1998); United States v. Atkins, 116 F.3d 1566, 
1571 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that a cumulative of facts can make downward departure not 
available for a defendant), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 975 (1997); United States v. Bradshaw, No. 
96 CR 485-1, 1999 WL 1129601, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1999) (holding acceptance of 
responsibility can lead to a downward departure in sentencing).  
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warranted . . . the extent of the departure should reflect the extent to which 
the reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the 
offense.59  
 
The 1998 amendments also redefined “reduced mental capacity” to include 
volitional as well as cognitive impairments. Under the amended Guidelines: 
“‘Significantly reduced mental capacity’ means the defendant, although convicted, 
has a significantly impaired ability to (A) understand the wrongfulness of the 
behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the power of reason; or (B) control 
behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful.”60  
The Feeney Amendment, effective 2003, further limited the circumstances 
under which a court could depart from the range of sentences prescribed in the 
Guidelines.61 Among other restrictions, the Amendment limits departures based on 
aberrant behavior and physical impairment. 62  The Amendment also prohibits 
departures based on diminished capacity in cases involving crimes against children 
and sexual offenses.63 In general, the Amendment prohibits departures based on 
factors that are not enumerated in the Guidelines or on combinations of factors that 
would not independently warrant a departure.64 
On the other hand, a more recent amendment to the Guidelines has, at least on 
its face, made federal sentencing more hospitable to PTSD claims by military 
veterans. The recent amendment notes that military service may be an appropriate 
mitigating factor “in determining whether a departure is warranted, if the military 
service, individually or in combination with other offender characteristics, is present 
to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered by 
                                                     
59  SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, § 5k2.13, at 477. The 
amendments also eliminated addiction to gambling as a reason for a downward departure. 
Id. Relying on this new language, the Third Circuit found that its earlier decision in United 
States v. Rosen was thus superseded. See 896 F. 2d 789 (3d Cir. 1990) (ruling defendant’s 
compulsive gambling did not warrant downward departure), reh’g & reh’g en banc denied 
(3d Cir. 1990), abrogated by United States v. Askari, 159 F.3d 774 (3d Cir. 1998). 
60 SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, § 5K2.13, at 477 cmt. 1 (amended 
1998). 
61 Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial 
Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 295 (2004). 
62 SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL, supra note 57, §§ 5K2.20, 5K2.22(2), at 479–81 
(amended 2003). 
63 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b)(2) (amended 2003); SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra 
note 57, § 5K2.0(b), at 466–67 (amended 2003). 
64 Id. 
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the guideline.”65 But, of course, not all states use guidelines modeled on the Federal 
law.66 
Trial courts have great discretion to determine when a sentence reduction is 
appropriate under the Guidelines,67 and decisions not to depart from the Guidelines 
generally are not appealable.68 Appellate courts are willing to disturb sentencing 
                                                     
65 See Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience, PTSD, and Sentencing Mitigation, 34 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 53, 70 (2012) (discussing SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 57, § 
5H1.11). For a discussion of this amendment’s potential value in this context, see Jeffrey 
Lewis Wieand, Jr., Continuing Combat at Home: How Judges and Attorneys Can Improve 
Their Handling of Combat Veterans with PTSD in Criminal Courts, 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL 
RTS. & SOC. JUST. 227, 255–56 (2012). 
66 See Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State and Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
Apples and Oranges, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 679–82 (1992) (describing differences 
between the state guideline systems and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). 
67 See, e.g., United States v. Osborn, 679 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2012) (ruling the 
lower court did not abuse its discretion when denying a reduction in defendant’s sentence 
under the Guidelines); United States v. Fennell, 592 F.3d 506, 510 (4th Cir. 2010) (ruling 
the district court can use its discretion in determining sentences); United States v. Smith, 595 
F.3d 1322, 1323 (5th Cir. 2010) (ruling the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
considered post-conviction disciplinary records when considering a reduction in defendant’s 
sentence); United States v. Goldberg, 295 F.3d 1133, 1138 (10th Cir. 2002) (ruling the 
district court abused its discretion by awarding downward departure because it did not want 
to incarcerate the defendant); United States v. Moreland, No. 96-30164, slip op. at *3 (9th 
Cir. July 21, 1997); United States v. Organek, 65 F.3d 60, 63 (6th Cir. 1995); United States 
v. White, 71 F.3d 920, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Yellow Earrings, 891 F.2d 650, 
654–55 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Volpe, 78 F. Supp. 2d 76, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
68 See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero, 510 F. App’x 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2013); United States 
v. Frankel, 443 F. App’x 603, 607 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Siegel, 271 F. App’x 115, 
117–18 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Ogman, 535 F.3d 108, 111 (2d Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Beckett, 169 F. App’x 643, 644 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. McDaniel, 175 F. 
App’x 456, 458 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Stinson, 465 F.3d 113, 114 (2d Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Langhorn, 30 F. App’x 358, 360 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Marin-
Mayorga, 8 F. App’x 520, 521 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Romero, No. 98-229, slip 
op. at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 2000); United States v. Timbana, 222 F.3d 688, 689 (9th Cir. 
2000); United States v. Mikaelian, 168 F.3d 380, 390 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Watkins, 179 F.3d 489, 503 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Steele, 178 F.3d 1230, 1237 
(11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Helmling, 116 F.3d 1489, 1489 (10th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Black, 116 F.3d 198, 201–02 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Walker, Nos. 96-
3049, 96-3064, 96-3065, slip op. at *8 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 1996); States v. Wilson, No. 95-
3197, slip op. at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 26, 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Nugent, No. 95-
3481, slip op. at *1 (6th Cir. June 14, 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Estergard, No. 95-
30047, slip op. at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 1996); United United States v. Chigbo, 38 F.3d 543, 
546 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); United States v. Patterson, 15 F.3d 169, 171 (11th Cir. 
1994); United States v. Schechter, 13 F.3d 1117, 1119–20 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Turner, No. 92-5687, slip op. at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 12, 1993) (per curiam); United States v. 
Ghannam, 899 F.2d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1990). Compare United States v. Follett, 905 F.2d 
195, 197 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1207 (1991) (upholding the district court’s 
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determinations only where it appears the District Court misunderstood its authority 
to reduce the defendant’s sentence.69  
In several cases, courts have invoked the Guidelines to reduce a defendant’s 
sentence based on his reduced mental capacity.70 In United States v. Speight,71 for 
instance, the court found a defendant, convicted of drug and firearm offenses, who 
suffered from schizophrenia and other emotional disturbances had met all the 
Guidelines’ criteria, and thus a sentence reduction was warranted.72 In United States 
                                                     
refusal to make a downward departure for defendant with a diminished mental capacity), 
with 905 F.2d 195, 197 (Heaney J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority should not have 
placed defendant in a minimum security prison that does not have the resources to meet the 
defendant’s mental health needs). 
69 See, e.g., United States v. Ruklick, 919 F.2d 95, 97–98 (8th Cir. 1990) (reversing the 
trial court’s refusal to depart from the Guidelines in case where the defendant had the mental 
capacity of a twelve-year old). On the need for specific findings in Guideline decision 
making see, for example, United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d 911, 923 (2d Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Perkins, 963 F.2d 1523, 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
70 See United States v. Lighthall, 389 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2004) (allowing downward 
departure for diminished capacity under the Guidelines because of the defendant’s bi-polar 
disorder); United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1516–17 (9th Cir. 1993) (determining PTSD 
is type of mental disorder that can support mental-disability-based downward departure); 
United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 605 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding departure from the 
Guidelines based on the defendant’s likely “extreme vulnerability” in a correctional facility); 
United States v. Cotto, 793 F. Supp. 64, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing that a defendant’s 
near retardation, vulnerability, efforts at rehabilitation and incompetence warranted 
downward departure). But see United States v. Valdez, 426 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(holding defendant’s IQ did not warrant a downward departure for diminished capacity under 
the Guidelines); United States v. Sheehan, 371 F.3d 1213, 1218–19 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding 
a downward departure was not granted for diminished capacity under the Guidelines even 
though he had been diagnosed with substance dependence and anti-social personality 
disorder); United States v. Greenfield, 244 F.3d 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (recognizing that 
depression does not warrant a downward departure). 
71 726 F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C. 1989). 
72 Id. at 867–68; see also United States v. Riggs, 370 F.3d 382, 391 (4th Cir. 2004), 
vacated, 543 U.S. 1110 (2005) (remanding for further consideration in light of United States 
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)), opinion reinstated, 410 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding 
Booker inapplicable, reinstating the prior opinion, and remanding the case for resentencing); 
Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1517 (allowing a finding of PTSD to be considered diminished capacity 
leading to a downward departure); United States v. Soliman, 954 F.2d 1012, 1014–15 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (affirming the sentencing court’s denial of defendant’s request for a downward 
departure where the defendant’s mental condition was not a “contributing cause of the 
crime”); United States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 1991) (upholding a downward 
departure on the grounds that the defendant “was suffering from significantly reduced mental 
capacity”); United States v. Doering, 909 F.2d 392, 394–95 (9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) 
(prohibiting an upward departure from the Guidelines where the upward departure is based 
on the defendant’s need for psychiatric care); Ruklick, 919 F.2d at 97–98 (allowing a 
downward departure where the “defendant’s diminished capacity comprised a contributing 
factor in the commission of the offense”); United States v. Brown, No. 97-6809, slip op. at 
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v. Ruklick,73 the court emphasized that under the Guidelines it was not necessary to 
find the defendant’s reduced mental capacity amounted to “but-for causation” in 
order to reduce a sentence, as long as his diminished mental capacity “comprised a 
contributing factor in the commission of the offense.”74  
Other cases have ruled the “precise degree” to which the defendant’s mental 
illness contributed to his criminal activity need not be “pinpoint[ed] or 
quantif[ied],”75 a defendant’s assertion of the insanity defense did not preclude a 
downward departure,76 and a defendant’s post-arrest efforts in drug rehabilitation 
                                                     
*7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1997) (granting downward departure for diminished mental capacity); 
United States v. Chambers, 885 F. Supp. 12, 14 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that a “significant 
downward departure is warranted” in light of the defendant’s “diminished capacity”); United 
States v. Adonis, 744 F. Supp. 336, 342–43 (D.D.C. 1990) (finding a reduced sentence 
permissible due to the defendant’s mental incapacity). For cases involving defendants with 
other mental disabilities, see, for example, United States v. Follette, 990 F. Supp. 1172, 1174 
(D. Neb. 1998) (suffering from bipolar disorder and PTSD); Brown, No. 97-6809 at *1 
(experiencing severe depression and PTSD). 
73 919 F. 2d 95 (8th Cir. 1990). 
74 Id. at 97–98; see also Valdez, 426 F.3d at 187 (denying defendant’s request for a 
downward departure); United States v. Perry, No. 98-4265, slip op. at *2–3 (4th Cir. Feb. 
17, 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision) (affirming the district court’s decision 
to grant defendant’s request for a downward departure due to mental incapacity); United 
States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (declining to use a but-for-causation 
test to decide whether to grant a downward departure); United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 
533, 548 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that a downward departure “should reflect the extent to which 
the offender’s reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense”), 
vacated, 991 F. Supp. 445 (D.N.J. 1998) (downward departure granted); United States v. 
Boutot, 480 F. Supp. 2d 413, 418 (D. Me. 2007) (deciding that the defendant qualified for a 
downward departure based on mental incapacity); United States v. Boeka, No. 8:06CR115, 
2006 WL 3780400, at *7 (D. Neb. Dec. 20, 2006) (granting defendant’s request for a 
downward departure based on extraordinary family circumstance, but denying downward 
departure based on diminished capacity); United States v. Shore, 143 F. Supp. 2d 74, 84 (D. 
Mass. 2001) (granting downward departure); United States v. Fluehr, Crim. No. 93-00376-
01, 1995 WL 37527, at *5–7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 1995) (granting downward departure because 
the defendant accepted responsibility and lacked moral culpability), amended by No. CRIM. 
93-00376-01, 1995 WL 106878 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 1995), aff’d, No. 95-1226, slip op. at 1 
(3d Cir. Dec. 7, 1995). 
75 United States v. Royal, 902 F. Supp. 268, 272 (D.D.C. 1995); see United States v. 
Dyer, 216 F.3d 568, 570 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting a defendant’s mental incapacity does not 
need to be the “but-for cause” or “sole cause” of the crime); United States v. Sutherland, 
Nos. 1:00CR00052, 1:01CR00009, 2001 WL 1502913, at *9 (W.D. Va. Nov. 27, 2001) 
(noting that there is no “foolproof method” to determine how much diminished capacity is 
needed to contribute to an offense). 
76 See United States v. Taylor, 483 F. App’x 992, 997 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Waldman, 310 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Barris, 4 F.3d 33, 35 (8th 
Cir. 1995). But see United States v. Sam, 467 F.3d 857, 862–63 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that 
“an insanity defense precludes an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction” in most cases); 
United States v. Gorsuch, 404 F.3d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that a defendant may 
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might warrant such a departure. 77  But generally, appellate courts uphold 
determinations not to depart from the Guidelines.78 
                                                     
not use an insanity defense and subsequently request a downward departure when the defense 
fails). 
77 United States v. Whitaker, 152 F.3d 1238, 1239 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, sub nom. Rodgers v. United States, 
519 U.S. 938 (1996), and sub nom. Green v. United States, 519 U.S. 955 (1996); United 
States v. Eisinger, 321 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1007 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (granting defendant a 
horizontal departure for overcoming her drug addiction and becoming a lower risk of 
reoffending); United States v. Rutherford, 323 F. Supp. 2d 911, 916 (E.D. Wis. 2004) 
(granting defendant downward departure for drug rehabilitation); United States v. Perella, 
273 F. Supp. 2d 162, 168–69 (D. Mass. 2003) (granting downward departure for defendant’s 
extraordinary drug rehabilitation); United States v. Jones, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1073 (E.D. 
Wis. 2002) (granting downward departure based upon defendants extraordinary drug 
rehabilitation); United States v. Wilkes, 130 F. Supp. 2d 222, 240 (D. Mass. 2001) (granting 
defendant a downward departure for post-arrest efforts to rehabilitate himself from his drug 
addiction); United States v. Kane, 88 F. Supp. 2d 408, 408–09 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (granting 
downward departure for defendant’s extraordinary rehabilitation). 
78 Thus, determinations not to depart have been upheld in cases in which the underlying 
crimes were violent and the defendant’s violent criminal record raised the possibility that he 
would be a threat to public safety. See e.g., United States v. Santos, 131 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 
1997) (identifying underlying crime of sending threatening letter to President of United 
States); United States v. Jones, No. 94-1948 (7th Cir. Mar. 2, 1995) (discussing four counts 
of bank robbery); United States v. Braxton, 19 F.3d 1385 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing armed 
robbery and carrying a firearm during commission of a felony), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 935 
(1994); United States v. Dailey, 24 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 1994) (determining interstate travel 
with intent to extort did not warrant downward departure but finding provocation that could); 
United States v. Premachandra, 32 F.3d 346 (8th Cir. 1994) (discussing defendant’s armed 
bank robberies), aff’d, 101 F.3d 68 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Salemi, 26 F.3d 1084 
(11th Cir. 1994) (assessing a kidnapping conviction), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1032 (1994); 
United States v. Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing money laundering, 
conspiracy, and mail fraud counts against defendant), aff’d, No. 94-1865 (1st Cir. Mar. 13, 
1995); Norflett v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 718, 719 (D. Mass. 1997) (considering bank 
robbery); United States v. Moore-Bey, 981 F. Supp. 688, 688 (D.D.C. 1997) (describing six 
counts of bank robbery), aff’d, United States v. Moore, 159 F.3d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 525 U.S. 918 (1998); Halmos v. United States, 872 F. Supp. 762, 768 (D. Haw. 1995) 
(considering bank robbery); United States v. Marquez, 827 F. Supp. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(identifying conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin), aff’d, 41 
F.3d 1502 (2d Cir. 1994). 
Determinations to not depart have also been upheld in cases in which the court did not 
find the defendant’s disability so significant as to warrant such a reduction. See, e.g., United 
States v. Annoreno, 713 F.3d 352, 353 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 335 (2013); 
United States v. Sammoury, 74 F.3d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Withers, 100 
F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1132 (1997); United States v. Johnson, 71 
F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1113 (1996); United States v. Jackson, 56 
F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Benson, No. 93-5204 (4th Cir. 1993) (unpublished 
table decision); United States v. Tucker, 986 F.2d 278 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 
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820 (1993); Samra v. Price, No. 2:07-cv-1962-LSC, 2014 WL 4452676 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 5, 
2014); Sims v. United States, Civ. No. 11-2267 (WHW), 2012 WL 1207202, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Apr. 11, 2012) reconsideration denied, Civ. No. 11-2267 (WHW), 2012 WL 3000461 
(D.N.J. July 23, 2012); Fluehr, 1995 WL 37527, at *3 ( finding the defendant’s behavior 
was not sufficiently aberrant). See, e.g., United States v. DeVegter, 439 F.3d 1299, 1305 
(11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Orrega, 363 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Dickerson, 381 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Constantine, 263 F.3d 
1122 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Benally, 215 F.3d 1068 (10th Cir. 2000); Aleman v. 
United States, No. 2:11cr1168-1, 2013 WL 4677781 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2013); United 
States v. Bailey, 377 F. Supp. 2d 268, 272 (D. Me. 2005); Thompson v. United States, No. 
99 C 1778, 2000 WL 821711 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2000). 
Determinations not to depart have also been upheld in cases in which the court did not 
find defendant’s “extraordinary post-arrest efforts” at drug rehabilitation sufficient to 
warrant such a reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Barton, 76 F.3d 499 (2d Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Williams, 37 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1994), appeal after remand, 65 F.3d 301 (2d 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 1993), appeal after remand, 39 
F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 1994). 
Determinations not to depart have also been upheld in cases in which there was no 
appeal after remand and it was demonstrated that there was no connection between the 
defendant’s diminished capacity and the commission of the crime. See, e.g., United States v. 
Dyer, 216 F.3d 568, 568–69 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cyprowski, No. 98-4172, slip 
op. at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 19, 1999), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1030 (1999); United States v. 
Sassani, No. 97-4011 (4th Cir. Mar. 4, 1998) (unpublished table decision), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 921 (1998); United States v. Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d 826 (6th Cir. 1996); United States 
v. Johnson, 49 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. White, 71 F.3d 920 (D.C. Cir. 
1995); United States v. Vasquez, No. 94 Cr. 839(RPP), 1997 WL 187315 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
16, 1997); United States v. Shaoul, No. 95 Civ. 5268 (DLD), 1996 WL 120713 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 18, 1996), aff’d, 104 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Portman, 599 
F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2010) (deciding defendant’s diminished capacity could not have led to the 
crime committed); United States v. Schneider, 429 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2005) (deciding 
diminished capacity cannot be considered with acceptance of responsibility); United States 
v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001) (deciding evidence of diminished capacity not 
admissible in case of  general intent crime); United States v. Goldstein, No. 2:10-cr-00525-
JAD-PAL, 2014 WL 1168969 (D. Nev. Mar. 21, 2014) (deciding diminished capacity 
evidence was admissible); United States v. Bissell, 954 F. Supp. 841 (D.N.J. 1996), aff’d, 
142 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 1998) (deciding diminished mental capacity based on “personality 
flaw” that made defendant “placid, unquestioning and compliant” insufficient to require 
downward departure); State v. Marchi, 243 P.3d 556, 562 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (deciding 
intoxication and diminished capacity did not add an additional element to the offense); State 
v. Guilliot, 22 P.3d 1266, 1267 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (finding no connection between 
hypoglycemia symptoms and defendant’s mental capacity at time of shooting). 
Determinations to not depart have also been upheld in cases in which the court felt that 
the defendant did not take sufficient responsibility for his role in the criminal offenses in 
question. See, e.g., United States v. White, 675 F.3d 1106, 1109–10 (8th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Moore, 322 F. App’x 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Gordon, 64 F.3d 281 
(7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1062 (1996); United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252 
(7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Artim, 944 F. Supp. 363, 369 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing United 
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Courts have split on the impact of childhood abuse and neglect on a defendant 
and on the likelihood of victimization following potential incarceration.79 Courts 
have also split on the question of whether a defendant’s “dangerous mental state” 
would make an upward departure appropriate,80 with at least one appellate court 
vacating an upward departure sentence and concluding the appropriate mechanism 
for protecting the public in such a case was a commitment proceeding, not an 
extended sentence.81 Another court rejected a request for a downward departure 
based on the defendant’s alleged susceptibility to undue influence by a codefendant 
who emotionally and sexually abused her.82  
  
                                                     
States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 996 (3d Cir. 1992)); United States v. Amerson, 864 F. 
Supp. 458 (M.D. Pa. 1994). 
79 Compare United States v. Ayers, 971 F. Supp. 1197, 1201 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (defendant 
entitled to downward departure), with United States v. Vela, 927 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 
1991) (defendant not entitled to such a departure), and United States v. Rosa, No. 96-1268, 
slip op. at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 25, 1996) (affirming district court’s denial of downward 
departure), and United States v. Rivera, 192 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming district 
court’s denial of downward departure). See generally United States v. Walking Eagle, 553 
F.3d 654, 659 (8th Cir. 2009) (court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing the defendant 
after considering childhood abuse and mental illnesses); United States v. Brady, 417 F.3d 
326, 336 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanding to district court for factual finding to determine if a 
downward departure was appropriate); United States v. Nowicki, 252 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1255 
(D.N.M. 2003) (downward departure was granted because defendant suffered from 
diminished capacity and childhood abuse). 
On the question of victimization, see United States v. Thornberg, 326 F.3d 1023, 1027 
(8th Cir. 2003) (defendant received an increased departure because he was likely to victimize 
others in the future); United States v. Coates, 996 F.2d 939, 942–43 (8th Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 595–96 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Lauzon, 938 F.2d 326, 
333 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Hamilton, 949 F.2d 190, 193–94 (6th Cir. 1991) (per 
curiam); United States v. Fairman, 947 F.2d 1479, 1480, 1482 (11th Cir. 1991). 
80 United States v. Hines, 26 F.3d 1469, 1472, 1479 (9th Cir. 1994), aff’d mem., after 
remand, Nos. 94-30397, 94-30398 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 1995) (remanding for further 
explanation by the trial court); see also United States v. Carson, 377 F. App’x 257, 259–60 
(3d Cir. 2010) (acknowledging defendant’s mental status, but affirming lower courts upward 
variance); United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822, 839 (10th Cir. 2008) (affirming upward 
variance for a person with mental illness); United States v. Barnes, 125 F.3d 1287, 1293–94 
(9th Cir. 1997) (determining upward departure was appropriate). 
81 See, e.g., United States v. Moses, 106 F.3d 1273, 1275–76 (6th Cir. 1997) (discussing 
availability of the commitment mechanism found in 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2012)); see also 
Pinson, 542 F.3d at 838 (expressing concern as to the trial court’s use of upward variances 
and failure to consider civil commitment). 
82 United States v. Rouse, 168 F.3d 1371, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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C.  Subsequent Supreme Court Developments 
 
Later judicial developments radically altered Guidelines practice. First, in 
Blakely v. Washington,83  the Supreme Court struck down the Washington state 
sentencing guidelines as unconstitutional.84 In Blakely, the Supreme Court applied 
its earlier ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 85  to hold that a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial was violated by a sentencing scheme that allowed a 
judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on facts neither 
admitted by the defendant nor found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.86 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, ruled Washington’s scheme, as applied 
to Blakely, ran afoul of the Court’s ruling in Apprendi.87 The Blakely Court held that 
“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 88  The majority noted it was not holding 
determinate sentencing per se unconstitutional89 and that the Guidelines were not 
before the Court.90  
In its next term, a deeply divided Supreme Court ruled in United States v. 
Booker91 that the Guidelines were subject to jury trial requirements of the Sixth 
Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that the jury find certain facts 
during sentencing was incompatible with Federal Sentencing Act, requiring 
severance of the Act’s provisions that had made guidelines “mandatory.” 92 
Sentencing judges must consider:  
  
                                                     
83 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
84 Id. at 305. 
85 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
86 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304–05. 
87 Id. at 308–14. 
88 Id. at 301 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 525). 
89 Id. at 309. 
90 Id. at 305 n.9. 
91 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
92 Id. at 245; see, e.g., United States v. Sam, 467 F.3d 857, 860–61 (5th Cir. 2006) 
(determining Booker requires court to consider and apply the Guidelines, but the Guidelines 
are no longer mandatory); cf. United States v. Brewer, 520 F.3d 367, 371 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(stating that under Booker, the court of appeals “lack[s] the authority to review a sentencing 
court’s denial of a downward departure unless the [trial] court failed to understand its 
authority to do so”). 
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(1) offense and offender characteristics; (2) the need for a sentence to 
reflect the basic aims of sentencing, namely, (a) “just punishment” 
(retribution), (b) deterrence, (c) incapacitation, (d) rehabilitation; (3) the 
sentences legally available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) Sentencing 
Commission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted 
disparities; and (7) the need for restitution.93 
 
At least one commentator has read Booker to make it “incumbent upon judges to 
consider the physical or mental health of a defendant during the sentencing phase, 
where it ordinarily would not have been allowed pre-Booker when the Guidelines 
were mandatory.” 94  In a thoughtful early analysis, John Parry, Director of the 
Commission on Mental & Physical Disability Law at the American Bar Association, 
who believes the impact of Booker and the other judicial developments referred to 
in this section on mental disability law will most likely be “limited,”95 has observed: 
                                                     
93 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–48 (2007) (outlining the statutory factors 
set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)). 
94  Natalie Hinton, Comment, Curing the BOP Plague with Booker: Addressing 
Inadequate Medical Treatment in the Bureau of Prisons, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 219, 228 
(2007). Following Booker, the Supreme Court approved the application of a presumption of 
substantive reasonableness for sentencing within the Guidelines. Rita, 551 U.S. at 347. For 
a careful critique of Rita in the context of Booker, see Benjamin J. Priester, Apprendi Land 
Becomes Bizarro World: “Policy Nullification” and Other Surreal Doctrines in the New 
Constitutional Law of Sentencing, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 22–35 (2011); see also Rita, 
551 U.S. at 366 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I am not blind to the fact that, as a practical matter, 
many federal judges continued to treat the Guidelines as virtually mandatory after our 
decision in Booker.”); id. at 390 (Souter, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns about district 
court judges’ “substantial gravitational pull” to the Guidelines, even after Rita and Booker); 
Bennett, supra note 26, at 515–16 (discussing the practical implications of Booker and Rita). 
A debate rages as to the impact of Booker discretion on the disparity in sentences given 
to white and African American defendants. Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN FEDERAL SENTENCING PRACTICES: AN UPDATE OF THE 
BOOKER REPORT’S MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2010/20100311_Multivariate_Regression_Analysis_Report.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NDW6-32EJ (demonstrating that Booker quadrupled the black-white 
sentencing gap among otherwise similar cases), with Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, 
Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the 
Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 78 (2013) (showing sentencing commission’s 
conclusions are “based on deeply flawed methods” and showing sentencing disparities are 
the result if prosecutors filing “mandatory minimums twice as often against black men as 
against comparable white men”). This becomes significant for the questions addressed in this 
Article, as it is estimated that 30% of all American soldiers who have fought in Afghanistan 
are African American. See Larry J. Pittman, A Thirteenth Amendment Challenge to Both 
Racial Disparities in Medical Treatments and Improper Physicians’ Informed Consent 
Disclosures, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 131, 131 (2003). 
95 Supreme Court Summary, supra note 27, at 137. 
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Booker and other recent cases—e.g., Blakely . . . Apprendi . . .—create the 
impression that in sentencing matters juries are sacrosanct, or close to it. 
The good aspect for defendants is that they have a Sixth Amendment right 
to have juries decide sentencing matters. This gives defense lawyers an 
important constitutional card to play in defending their clients, which is 
particularly important when mitigating circumstances are to be 
presented.96 
 
Continuing, Parry expressed concern that “this trend . . . helps fuel the 
misimpression that juries are somehow better suited to assess expert evidence related 
to sentencing than are judges,”97 adding that  
 
one of the critical problems in the criminal justice system for defendants 
with mental and other disabilities is that jurors are not particularly 
competent in dealing with complex expert evidence, and like many people 
in society, tend to have a bias against such defendants, who tend to be 
stigmatized by their disabilities.98 
 
Parry continued, “The notion that expert evidence regarding a person’s mental 
status—which even in the best circumstances engenders considerable doubts in 
terms of its relevance and accuracy—can be made more relevant and accurate after 
being ‘weighed’ by a jury is not only naive but is also incredible.”99  
  
                                                     
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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D.  Impact of Booker 
 
Slowly courts have begun to consider the impact of Booker on cases involving 
defendants with mental disabilities. 100  In United States v. Anderson, 101  while 
interpreting Booker in a case vacating the defendant’s sentence, the court 
specifically noted, “the government fail[ed] to account for the district court’s 
consideration and discussion of Anderson’s ‘serious mental health issues,’ presented 
in support of his request for a downward departure.”102 Elsewhere, courts have relied 
on Booker as authority for imposing non-Guidelines sentences in cases of defendants 
seeking downward departures based on diminished mental capacities,103 specifically 
                                                     
100 See Developments in the Law – Mental Illness: Booker, The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, and Violent Mentally Ill Offenders, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1133–35 (2008); 
see also Jeffrey T. Ulmer & Michael T. Light, The Stability of Case Processing and 
Sentencing Post-Booker, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 143, 175 (2010). Relying upon Paul 
Hofer, Ulmer and Light note that: 
 
[P]revious employment, drug and alcohol dependence, age, family and 
community ties, and mental and emotional conditions are cited in a larger portion 
of cases after the Booker decision than they were before, which suggests that the 
Guideline commentary making these characteristics ‘not ordinarily relevant’ is 
more frequently being disregarded by judges or given a more restricted reading. 
 
Id. (quoting Paul Hofer, United States v. Booker as a Natural Experiment: Using 
Empirical Research to Inform the Federal Sentencing Policy Debate, 6 CRIMINOLGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 433, 450 (2007)). 
101 452 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2006). 
102 Id. at 93. 
103 See, e.g., United States v. MacKinnon, 401 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Here, we 
believe that this record, in light of the judge’s comments and the numerous grounds presented 
by MacKinnon for departure that could not be considered under a mandatory Guidelines 
system, presents a case for remand.”); United States v. Pallowick, 364 F. Supp. 2d 923, 926 
(E.D. Wis. 2005) (“In the present case, defendant moved for a downward departure based on 
his diminished mental capacity and vulnerability to abuse in prison. However, this was before 
Booker made the guidelines advisory. . . . Consistent with [defendant’s] argument[,] . . . I 
concluded that a non-guideline sentence was appropriate . . . .”); United States v. Jones, 352 
F. Supp. 2d 22, 23–24, 26 (D. Me. 2005) (ruling sentence would have been impossible before 
Booker because neither mental and emotional conditions, diminished capacity, nor efforts 
toward rehabilitation would have entitled the defendant to a downward departure); see also 
United States v. Jackson, 547 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that Booker has made 
considering Guidelines an “additional element within the §3553 factors”); United States v. 
Stinson, 465 F.3d 113, 114 (2d Cir. 2006) (ruling that refusal to downwardly depart is not 
generally appealable under Booker); United States v. Villanueva, No. 07-CR-149, 2007 WL 
4410378, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 14, 2007) (“But if Booker means anything at all, it must 
mean that the court can give further weight to factors covered by the guidelines, and consider 
personal characteristics deemed disfavored or discouraged by the guidelines.” (citations 
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looking, in some cases, at the effects of combat trauma and military service.104 
As indicated above,105 a significant number of federal judges have backpedalled 
away from Booker in dramatic fashion, making sentencing decisions as if Mistretta 
v. United States was still the law.106 What is not clear is the extent to which judges 
will consider the DSM-5’s expanded definition of PTSD in subsequent litigation in 
light of their demonstrated reluctance to embrace the right to be discretionary. 
 
E.  The Impact of Sanism 
 
1.  The Meaning of Sanism 
 
I have written extensively about what I call “sanism”—“an irrational prejudice 
of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are 
reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic 
bigotry.”107 Sanism permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all 
participants in the mental disability law system: litigants, fact finders, counsel, and 
expert and lay witnesses.108 It affects the administration of the process to determine 
                                                     
omitted)); Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 
39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 726–27 (2005) (explaining that courts post-Booker are using broad 
latitude in selecting sentencing criteria and citing Jones as an example). 
104 Wieand, supra note 65, at 251–55 (discussing combat trauma and military service 
in the context of United States v. Brownfield, Criminal Case No.08-cr-00452-JLK, at 2 (D. 
Colo. Dec. 18, 2009), available at http:// graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/2010030 
3brownfield-opinion-order.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Q8CZ-W95E). 
105 See supra text accompanying note 28. 
106 See, e.g., Siegler, supra note 28, at 103 and accompanying text. In this context, 
Professor Siegler discusses and sharply criticizes cases that routinely ignore mitigating 
factors and impose sentences as if the Guidelines were still mandatory, such as United States 
v. Tahzib, 513 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Chapman, 694 F.3d 908 
(7th Cir. 2012). See Siegler, supra note 28, at 106–09. 
For an important recent opinion sharply criticizing the government’s efforts to enhance 
criminal sentences by seeking enhanced sentences under the rubric of “relevant conduct” 
under the Guidelines (conduct involving crimes that have not been charged (or, if charged, 
have led to an acquittal) and have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt), see United 
States v. St. Hill, 768 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2014) (Torruella, J., concurring). My thanks to my 
friend and colleague David Wexler for alerting me to this opinion. 
107 Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians and Protectors of the Mind”: The 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law, 
117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1159, 1180 (2013). 
108 Multiple sanist myths are applied to persons with mental disabilities. See, e.g., 
Michael L. Perlin, “My Sense of Humanity Has Gone Down the Drain”: Stereotypes, Stigma 
and Sanism, in STEREOTYPING AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE (Eva Brehms & Alexandra 
Timmer eds., 2015) (in press), manuscript at 7 (describing the primary myth: “Mentally ill 
individuals are ‘different,’ and, perhaps, less than human. They are erratic, deviant, morally 
weak, sexually uncontrollable, emotionally unstable, superstitious, lazy, ignorant and 
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competency to stand trial,109 adjudication of the insanity defense,110 and ruling on 
death penalty determinations.111  In similar ways, it has a pernicious impact on 
criminal sentencing.112 
Sanism must also be considered in the context of what I have frequently 
referred to as false “ordinary common sense” (OCS), a “powerful unconscious 
animator of legal decision making.”113  
 
It is a psychological construct that reflects the level of the disparity 
between perception and reality that regularly pervades the judiciary in 
deciding cases involving individuals with mental disabilities. OCS is self-
referential and non-reflective: “I see it that way, therefore everyone sees it 
that way; I see it that way, therefore that’s the way it is.”114 “It is supported 
by our reliance on a series of heuristics and cognitive-simplifying devices 
that distort our abilities to consider information rationally.”115 
 
Because it is pre-reflexive and self-evident, it is also susceptible to precisely the type 
of idiosyncratic, reactive decision making that has contaminated all of mental 
                                                     
demonstrate a primitive morality. They lack the capacity to show love or affection. They 
smell different from ‘normal’ individuals, and are somehow worth less.”). I discuss the 
impact of these myths on the justice system in, inter alia, PERLIN, PRESCRIPTION FOR 
DIGNITY, supra note 38, at 202–07; PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 47, at 243–44; 
Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism”, 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 375 (1992). 
109 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Dignity Was the First to Leave”: Godinez v. Moran, 
Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAV. SCI. & 
L. 61, 75 (1996); Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA 
on the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 
193, 213–14, 234 (2001) [hereinafter Perlin, For the Misdemeanor]. 
110 See, e.g., Perlin, His Brain, supra note 32. 
111 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The 
Puzzling Role of “Mitigating” Mental Disability Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 239, 241–42 (1994) [hereinafter Perlin, The Sanist Lives]. 
112 See generally Perlin & Gould, supra note 29, at 442–44 (describing sanism and 
arguing “[i]n this environment, it is easy to understand how evidence of mental illness—
ostensibly introduced for mitigating purposes—can instead be construed by judges as an 
aggravating factor”). 
113 See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “She Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, The 
Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of “Ordinary Common Sense,” 10 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 1, 25 (2004) [hereinafter Perlin, She Breaks]; Michael L. Perlin, “Simplify You, 
Classify You”: Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil Rights in Disability Classification Systems, 25 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 621–22 (2009) [hereinafter Perlin, Simplify You]. 
114 Id. at 365. 
115 Michael L. Perlin, “Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail”: Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
to Remediate the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & 
L. 343, 365 n.127 (2013) (quoting PERLIN, PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY, supra note 38, at 31). 
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disability law.116 OCS underlies much of our sanist behavior. “[W]here defendants 
do not conform to popular images of ‘craziness,’ the notion of a handicapping mental 
disability is flatly and unthinkingly rejected.”117 Just as it is essential to understand 
OCS and sanism if we are to understand why attitudes toward the insanity defense 
have developed as they have,118 it is equally necessary to understand them if we wish 
to understand why sentencing decisions in the cohort of cases I discuss have 
developed as they have. 
 
2.  Sanism and Sentencing 
 
How is it possible that people should be punished more harshly because of 
mental illness?119 Cases decided under the Guidelines reflect a lack of understanding 
by federal judges of the meaning of mental disability and its role as a potential 
sentencing mitigator.120 In sentencing decision making, judges all too frequently 
conceptualize mental disability as an “all or nothing” construct; demand a showing 
of mental disability that approximates the amount needed for an exculpatory insanity 
defense; continue to not “get” distinctions between mental illness, insanity, and 
incompetency; repeat sanist myths about mentally disabled criminal defendants; and 
engage in pretextual decision making.121 
The ominous spirit of Justice Scalia’s partial dissent in Penry v. Lynaugh122—
castigating the majority for allowing an “outpouring . . . [of] unfocused 
sympathy”123—looms over many of these cases. Most of the few cases in which 
                                                     
116  Id.; see also Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: 
“Ordinary Common Sense” and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 29 (1990) 
[hereinafter Perlin, Psychodynamics] (describing OCS’s effect on the criminal justice 
system). On the impact of the anchoring heuristic on sentencing decisions in general, see 
Bennett, supra note 26, at 491. 
117 Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 116, at 24 (internal quotation marks removed) 
(quoting Harold D. Lasswell, Foreword to RICHARD ARENS, INSANITY DEFENSE at xi (1974). 
118 Perlin, She Breaks, supra note 113, at 25–26. 
119 J. C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-
Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1395 (2011). 
120 Perlin & Gould, supra note 29, at 452–55. 
121 See PERLIN, PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY, supra note 38, at 202. 
122 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
123  Id. at 359–60 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting 
defendant’s argument that the death penalty was cruel and unusual punishment in cases of 
defendants with mental retardation). The majority in Penry had concluded that evidence as 
to the defendant’s mental retardation was relevant to his culpability and that, without such 
information, jurors could not express their “reasoned moral response” in determining the 
appropriateness of the death penalty. Id. at 321. I discuss Penry extensively in PERLIN & 
CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 11, § 12-3.3, at 493–500, and in Michael L. 
Perlin, “The Executioner’s Face Is Always Well-Hidden”: The Role of Counsel and the 
Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 213–14 (1997). Although 
Penry’s holding on the cruel and unusual punishment question was abrogated by Atkins v. 
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mental disability is seen as a mitigator eerily track the fact pattern of the few 
situations in which jurors grudgingly sanction the use of the insanity defense: when 
a defendant, especially one who has previously sought counseling, commits a 
nonplanful crime.124  
The attitudes expressed in these cases are frequently sanist. For example, in a 
Sixth Circuit case the court rejected the defendant’s “suicidal tendencies” as a 
possible basis for a downward departure on a conviction of embezzlement.125 The 
court held departure would never be permissible on this basis because any 
consideration of such an argument would lead to “boilerplate” claims and force 
courts to “separate the wheat of valid claims from the chaff of disingenuous ones,” 
a “path before which we give serious pause.” 126  This argument tracks, nearly 
verbatim, the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit, which refused to grant a downward 
departure for a defendant who had suffered severe childhood sexual abuse, referring 
to the “innumerable defendants” that could plead “unstable upbringing” as a 
potential departure grounds.127  
Just as evidence of organic disorder appears more “real” to judges in insanity 
cases than does evidence of psychological disability128 because it is more “visible” 
(via an X-ray or fMRI scan) and appears less likely to be falsified,129 so does such 
evidence appear more “real” in Guidelines cases. In United States v. Hamilton,130 
the Sixth Circuit affirmed a trial court’s refusal to enter a downward departure in the 
                                                     
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (execution of defendant with mental retardation is 
unconstitutional as “cruel and unusual punishment”), Justice Scalia’s line of thought 
certainly lives on. On the relationship between Penry and Atkins generally, see James W. 
Ellis, Disability Advocacy and the Death Penalty: The Road from Penry to Atkins, 33 N.M. 
L. REV. 173 (2003). Atkins has since been modified and strengthened by Hall v. Florida, 134 
S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014) (in the aftermath of Atkins, Florida defined intellectual disability to 
require an IQ test score of seventy or less; such a rigid rule created an unacceptable risk that 
persons with intellectual disability will be executed and, thus, was unconstitutional). 
124 Perlin, The Sanist Lives, supra note 111, at 267. In the small universe of successful 
insanity-defense cases, jurors more grudgingly sanction the defense’s use. See, e.g., id. at 
245–49. Using OCS, jurors assume a defendant who could plan a crime must not be legally 
insane. See Perlin & Gould, supra note 29, at 435 n.14. 
125 United States v. Harpst, 949 F.2d 860, 863–64 (6th Cir. 1991). 
126 Id. 
127 United States v. Daly, 883 F.2d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 1989). Other jurisdictions have 
reiterated the rationale articulated in Daly. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, No. 91-3665 (8th 
Cir. May 26, 1992); United States v. Vela, 927 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1991); United States 
v. Lucas, No. 91-3047 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 22, 1991); United States v. Desormeaux, 952 F.2d 
182, 185 (8th Cir. 1991). 
128  MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 252–58 
(1994). 
129 I discuss this in the context of the use of neuroscience evidence in insanity cases in 
Perlin, His Brain, supra note 32. 
130 949 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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case of a defendant suffering a “major depressive episode,”131 on the theory that the 
Commission was “talking about things such as a borderline mental intelligence 
capacity.”132 The court concluded that, because the “defendant was able to absorb 
information in the usual way and to exercise the power of reason,” he did not suffer 
from a “significantly reduced mental capacity.”133 
The District of Columbia Circuit has explicitly rejected the admission of expert 
testimony on an individual defendant’s potential for successful rehabilitation on two 
grounds. First, another defendant without access to such expert testimony might be 
able to make a similar case for leniency. 134  Second, reliance on “scientific” 
predictions could transform sentencing hearings into an inappropriate “battle of 
experts.”135 But as Professor Schulhofer noted in his critique of United States v. 
Harrington,136 a district court always has the capacity to appoint expert witnesses to 
aid a defendant at sentencing, an option made explicitly constitutional in a different 
context in Ake v. Oklahoma.137  
A powerful current of blame underlies many of the Guidelines cases: the 
defendant succumbed to temptation by not resisting drugs or alcohol, by not 
overcoming childhood abuse, and so forth. This sense of blame mirrors courts’ sanist 
impatience with mentally disabled criminal defendants in general, attributing their 
problems in the legal process to “weak character or poor resolve.”138 Thus, we 
should not be surprised to learn that a trial judge, responding to a National Center 
for State Courts survey, indicated that defendants who are incompetent to stand trial 
could have understood and communicated with their counsel and the court “if they 
[had] only wanted.”139 Again, one of the leading texts on sentencing of white-collar 
crimes stresses: 
 
                                                     
131 Id. at 191. 
132 Id. at 191–93. 
133 Id. at 193. 
134 United States v. Harrington, 947 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
135 Id. at 960. 
136 Id. 
137 470 U.S. 68, 82 (1985); see also Schulhofer, supra note 50, at 869 (discussing Ake). 
138 Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 
47 MIAMI L. REV. 625, 670–71 (1993). See generally Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline 
Which Separated You from Me”: The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of 
Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1422 (1997) (“Because of 
sanism, society blames mentally ill individuals for their own plight . . . .”); Bernard Weiner, 
On Sin Versus Sickness: A Theory of Perceived Responsibility and Social Motivation, 48 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 957 (1993) (proposing a conceptual system of social motivation to balance 
societal tendencies that tend to encourage punishment for those who demonstrate a “lack of 
effort” or who are “responsible” for their failure). 
139 PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 47, at 256–57 (quoting Keri A. Gould et al., 
Criminal Defendants With Trial Disabilities: The Theory and Practice of Competency 
Assistance 90 (1993) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)). 
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Judges consider[] two major concepts pertinent to individual attributes of 
the offender: blameworthiness and consequence . . . . Certain 
characteristics of offenders relate to the culpability of or degree of 
blameworthiness of the particular defendant. Illustrations include mental 
competency . . . .140  
 
I now turn to the history of PTSD in the DSM, and how the new definition in 
DSM-5 may potentially augur some changes in the patterns and practices I have 
just discussed. 
 
III.  PTSD HISTORY141 
 
A.  PTSD Initially 
 
Until the publication of the DSM-IV, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
was seen as a disorder that often follows “a psychologically traumatic event that is 
generally outside the range of usual human experience.”142 In the DSM-IV, it was 
characterized as a condition under which a person “experienced, witnessed, or was 
confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious 
injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others” and, “the person’s 
response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror.”143 
                                                     
140  PERLIN, PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY, supra note 38, at 204 (quoting STANTON 
WHEELER ET AL., THE SENTENCING OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS 20–21 (1988)). 
141 Some of this section is adapted from PERLIN & CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, 
supra note 11, § 9A-9.3b, at 271–74. 
142  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 236 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-III]; see, e.g., C. 
R. JEFFERY, ATTACKS ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE: BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY AND NEW 
PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 94 (1985); Stephen Joseph et al., Post-Traumatic 
Stress: Attributional Aspects, 6 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 501, 501 (1993); Richard J. Ross et 
al., Sleep Disturbance as the Hallmark of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 146 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 697, 697 (1989); Wilbur J. Scott, PTSD in DSM-III: A Case in the Politics of 
Diagnosis and Disease, 37 SOC. PROBS. 294, 294 (1990). It has been suggested that Samuel 
Pepys developed PTSD as a result of the London Fire of 1666. See R. J. Daly, Samuel Pepys 
and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 143 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 64, 64–66 (1983). References 
to symptoms of PTSD in the literature (e.g., “combat neurosis,” “battle fatigue,” and “shell 
shock”) date to the time of the Revolutionary War. See JEFFERY, supra, at 94 (citing 
Geraldine L. Brotherton, Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder—Opening Pandora’s Box?, 
17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 91, 93 (1981)). For a helpful historical perspective, see Brotherton, 
supra, at 92–100. For a discussion on the use of the phrases “battle fatigue” and “operational 
fatigue” during World War II, see DARYL S. PAULSON & STANLEY KRIPPNER, HAUNTED BY 
COMBAT: UNDERSTANDING PTSD IN WAR VETERANS INCLUDING WOMEN, RESERVISTS, 
AND THOSE COMING BACK FROM IRAQ, at 8–9 (2007). 
143  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 426–28 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV]. On why 
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PTSD has been in the public’s consciousness since at least World War II in the 
context of what has been called “the slap around the world”144—the “legendary”145 
story of General George Patton slapping a soldier in a battlefield hospital.146 One of 
the first law review articles to discuss PTSD characterized this slap as an “extreme 
example of military intolerance for warrior weakness.”147 There is little question 
                                                     
the DSM-IV definition may have reduced the prevalence rate of PTSD diagnoses, see Lisa 
Richardson et al., Prevalence Estimates of Combat-Related PTSD: A Critical Review, 44 
AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 4, 7–8 (2010). Dr. Robert Spitzer, the primary author of the 
DSM-III, has concluded that with the exception of Dissociative Identity Disorder, no other 
DSM diagnosis “has generated so much controversy in the field as to the boundaries of the 
disorder, diagnostic criteria, central assumptions, clinical utility and prevalence in various 
populations.” Robert L. Spitzer et al., Saving PTSD from Itself in DSM-V, 21 J. ANXIETY 
DISORDERS 233, 233 (2007). Spitzer and his colleagues further argued that some of the 
diagnostic criteria in DSM-IV were of “questionable validity,” id. at 234, and urged the 
drafters of DSM-5 “to formulate more stringent criteria” to “dispel[] . . . confusion” in this 
area. Id. at 240. 
144 Paul G. Cassell, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations: The Right 
of Access, Grenada, and “Off-the-Record Wars”, 73 GEO. L.J. 931, 972 n.284 (1985). 
145 Perlin, John Brown Went Off to War, supra note 6, at 459. 
146  
During the action in Sicily, General Patton visited an evacuation hospital. 
He was conducted to the receiving tent, where [fifteen] casualties had just come 
in from the front. 
“Where Were You Hurt?” The General went down the line, asking each 
patient where he had been hurt. On the edge of the fourth bed sat a soldier with 
no visible wounds. He had been sent back by his divisional medical officer, 
tentatively diagnosed as a severe case of psychoneurosis. He was still in battle 
dress. 
The General asked him the routine question. The soldier answered: “It’s my 
nerves. I can hear the shells come over but I can’t hear them burst.” 
Patton turned to the medical officer and asked, “What’s this man talking 
about? What’s wrong with him--if anything?” Patton began to shout at the man. 
His high voice rose to a scream, in such language as: “You dirty no-good------! 
You cowardly--! You’re a disgrace to the Army and you’re going right back to 
the front to fight, although that’s too good for you. . . .” Patton reached for his 
white-handled single-action Colt. 
The man sat quivering on his cot. Patton slapped him sharply across the face, 
turned to the commanding medical officer who had come in when he heard 
Patton’s high-pitched imprecations. “I want you to get that man out of here right 
away. I won’t have these other brave boys seeing such a bastard babied.” 
 
Id. (citing Michael McCarthy, Essay, Diversionary Tactics: Alternative Procedures for 
the Prosecution of Military Veterans, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 475, 477–78 (2012)). 
147  Michael J. Davidson, Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: A Controversial 
Defense for Veterans of a Controversial War, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 434 n.151 
(1988).  
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that, “before Vietnam, no single event contributed more to public awareness of 
PTSD” than this incident.148 
PTSD globally became part of the public’s consciousness following the return 
of Vietnam War veterans149 as a result of their Vietnam experiences.150 Symptoms 
of Vietnam Stress Syndrome (as it was popularly known) included re-experiencing 
the traumatic event, numbing of responsiveness to the outside world, hyperalertness 
or exaggerated “startle response,” sleep disturbance, and memory impairment.151 
Individuals who suffer from this syndrome often show increased irritability, 
impulsive behavior, and unpredictable explosions of aggression with little or no 
provocation.152  
 
                                                     
When I presented a draft of this paper to a seminar of veteran forensic psychiatrists, 
some in the audience wondered whether there was still a reluctance on the part of veterans 
with PTSD to “admit” (quotation marks essential) to a “weakness” such as this disorder, and 
that whether that reluctance might lead some to deny their disability, thus making it 
impossible for their lawyers to raise PTSD as a mitigating factor. I know of no such cases in 
which this has happened, but it is certainly plausible that it has. Cf. Godinez v. Moran, 509 
U.S. 389, 392 (1993) (evaluating whether a defendant may seek to represent himself pro se 
to prevent his lawyer from presenting mitigating evidence at the punishment phase of his 
death penalty trial). 
148 John Lockman, The Thousand Yard Stare: Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, the 
Invisible Casualty of War, THE ERNEST BECKER FOUND., http://ernestbecker.org/news-
archives/the-thousand-yard-stare-post-traumatic-stress-disorder-the-invisible-casualty-of-
war.html, archived at http://perma.cc/YF5H-NFKA (last visited Mar. 29, 2015). 
149 There were an inordinately high number of Vietnam veterans in federal prison in the 
1970s and 1980s. See Elizabeth J. Delgado, Comment, Vietnam Stress Syndrome and the 
Criminal Defendant, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 473, 478 (1985). 
150 Id. at 475; see, e.g., C. Peter Erlinder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Vietnam 
Veterans and the Law: A Challenge to Effective Representation, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 25, 
30 (1983); John O. Lipkin et al., Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Vietnam Veterans: 
Assessment in a Forensic Setting, 1 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 51, 64–65 (1983); J. Ingram Walker 
& Jesse O. Cavenar, Vietnam Veterans: Their Problems Continue, 170 J. NERVOUS & 
MENTAL DISEASE 174 (1982); John P. Wilson & Sheldon D. Zigelbaum, The Vietnam 
Veteran on Trial: The Relation of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to Criminal Behavior, 1 
BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 69, 71–76 (1983). The National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Study 
reported that over 30.9% of all men who served in Vietnam developed PTSD. See Richard 
J. McNally, Can We Solve the Mysteries of the National Vietnam Veterans Readjustment 
Study?, 21 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 192, 193 (2007). The Vietnam War was especially 
“traumatogenic,” because the war was unpopular, leadership and morale were poor, 
boundaries and military objectives were unclear, atrocities were common, and America lost. 
Id. at 194. 
151 Delgado, supra note 149, at 476. 
152  See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV, supra note 143, at 424–26. For a 
comprehensive consideration of how PTSD influences behavior, see Constantina Aprilakis, 
Note, The Warrior Returns: Struggling to Address Criminal Behavior by Veterans with 
PTSD, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 552–56 (2005). 
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B.  After Iraq and Afghanistan 
 
More recently, in the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, veterans have been 
diagnosed with PTSD at frightening rates,153 and they continue to bear the “invisible 
wounds” of battle.154 As indicated previously, it is estimated that between 10% and 
20% of all veterans returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan exhibit 
characteristics of mental illness, including PTSD. 155  These veterans’ war 
experiences have been significantly different from the experiences of veterans in 
other wars. 156  By way of example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, there have been 
significantly greater lengths of time leading to deployment and eventual combat and 
                                                     
153 These wars have resulted in the largest wave of returning veterans with disabilities 
in recent history. See Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Law, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2010). The Iraqi and Afghanastani war experiences have 
been significantly different from the experiences of veterans in other wars. 
 
First, individual service-members have been subjected to more frequent and 
longer deployments to the front than in previous conflicts. Second, the 
counterinsurgency type of warfare blurs periods of battle and periods of rest, 
prompting the stressful constant vigilance that can lead to psychological ailments. 
Third, improvements in protective equipment and battlefield medicine have 
allowed more victims of battlefield trauma to survive but often with lingering 
effects from their injuries. And, fourth, the signature weapon of the opposition—
the improvised explosive device—often causes traumatic brain injuries that are 
difficult to diagnose and treat and may not present symptoms until well after the 
injury. 
 
Steven Berenson, The Movement Toward Veterans Courts, J. L. & POL’Y, May/June 
2010, at 37, 38 (citations omitted); see, e.g., Daniel Burgess et al., Reviving the “Vietnam 
Defense”: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Criminal Responsibility in a Post-
Iraq/Afghanistan World, 29 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 59, 60, 78 (2010); Richard L. Frierson, 
Combat-Related Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Criminal Responsibility Determinations 
in the Post-Iraq Era: A Review and a Case Report, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 79, 
79 (2013); Mark A. McCormick-Goodhart, Note, Leaving No Veteran Behind: Policies and 
Perspectives on Combat Trauma, Veterans Courts, and the Rehabilitative Approach to 
Criminal Behavior, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 895, 898–99 (2013). 
154 See Berenson, supra note 153, at 37–38. War may be the “most abiding cause of 
disability in human history.” David A. Gerber, Disabled Veterans and Public Welfare Policy: 
Comparative and Transnational Perspectives on Western States in the Twentieth Century, 
11 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 78 (2001). 
155 Charles W. Hoge et al., Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health 
Problems, and Barriers to Care, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 13, 13 (2004); Peter W. Tuerk et al., 
Combat-Related PTSD: Scope of the Current Problem, Understanding Effective Treatment, 
and Barriers to Care, 29 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 49, 49 (2010). 
156 Berenson, supra note 153, at 37–38. 
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a greater attachment to the unit with which soldiers have served. Both of these 
factors have contributed to significantly enhanced stress levels.157  
The stressors faced by soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan far outnumber the 
stressors faced by soldiers in previous wars.158 More veterans of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan are afflicted with physical injuries and complex challenges than 
veterans of the war in Vietnam.159 By way of example, the average infantryman in 
the South Pacific Theater in World War II saw approximately 40 days of combat per 
year; the average infantryman in Vietnam saw approximately 240 days of combat in 
a year, and troops in Iraq and Afghanistan experienced 310 days of combat in the 
same amount of time.160 The data is sobering; 30% of all veterans of the wars in Iraq 
                                                     
157 See Allison Adrienne Whitesell, Unit Cohesion, Attachment, Personality Factors, 
and Mental Health in Veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan (Dec. 29, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville), available at http://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=2178&context=utk_graddiss, archived at http://perma.cc/M9ZD-
WV9L; Mental Health Effects of Serving in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/PTSD-overview/reintegration/overview-mental-
health-effects.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/5CWR-UFK5 (last updated Jan. 3, 2014). 
158 See, e.g., Mental Health Effects of Serving in Afghanistan and Iraq, supra note 157. 
 
Combat Stressors 
Seeing 
dead 
bodies 
Being 
shot 
at 
Being 
attacked/ 
ambushed 
Receiving 
rocket or 
mortar fire 
Know 
someone 
killed/ 
seriously 
injured 
Iraq Army 95% 93% 89% 86% 86% 
Iraq Marines 94% 97% 95% 92% 87% 
Afghanistan Army 39% 66% 58% 84% 43% 
 
159  Wayne Kinney, Comparing PTSD Among Returning War Veterans, J. MIL. & 
VETERANS HEALTH, Aug. 2012, at 21, 21. 
160 See e.g., Matthew Gregory, A Response to the Washington Post’s “I’m an Army 
Veteran, and My Benefits Are Too Generous”, HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2014, 3:21 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matthew-gregory/a-response-to-the-washing_b_5474712 
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2NLM-7JXN; Our Warriors Today and “Combat 
Trauma”, AM. ASS’N OF CHRISTIAN COUNSELORS, http://www.aacc.net/2011/5/17/our-
warriors-today-and-“combat-trauma”, archived at http://perma.cc/RS9T-ETGH (last visited 
May 7, 2015); Statistics About the Vietnam War, HISTORY.COM, http://www.vhfcn.org/stat 
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4FUW-4ZJE (last visited May 7, 2015). Importantly, a 
collateral lesson of WWII was that it was more likely that inexperienced troops would suffer 
from combat stress than seasoned soldiers, that more intense combat increased the likelihood 
of a stressful reaction, and that group morale was a huge factor in preventing war trauma. 
See ILONA MEAGHER, MOVING A NATION TO CARE: POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 
AND AMERICA’S RETURNING TROOPS 18 (2007). For the first contemporaneous study of what 
was initially called “combat neurosis,” see Roy L. Swank & Walter E. Marchand, Combat 
Neurosis: Development of Combat Exhaustion, 55 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 
236 (1946). 
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and Afghanistan have thought of committing suicide, and 45% of them know a 
veteran of one of those wars who has attempted suicide (37% know someone whose 
attempt was successful).161  
As symptoms of PTSD are similar to other disorders, there is a relatively high 
chance of misdiagnosing the syndrome as an anxiety or depressive disorder, an 
antisocial personality disorder, or hysterical neurosis.162 Further, the relatively high 
frequency of alcohol and drug abuse among those who are diagnosed with PTSD 
may exacerbate the problems caused by such misdiagnoses. 163  Because the 
symptomatology of PTSD and antisocial personality disorder are so similar, there is 
a greater concern that PTSD appears to be “an easy defense to fabricate,” 164 
especially because diagnosis is so dependent upon the defendant’s self-reporting of 
symptoms. 165  Critics have argued, however, that the use of new neuroscience 
techniques in the development of external measures of assessment should obviate 
most of these concerns.166 
 
C.  PTSD in the Courts 
 
While it would appear that war-related PTSD could be used to support a 
reduced sentence, fact finders generally have been reluctant to accept the validity of 
such arguments,167 and in parallel circumstances, they have ruled that failure of 
                                                     
161  2013 MEMBER SURVEY, IRAQ & AFGHANISTAN VETERANS OF AM. 3 (2013), 
available at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/743176/iavamembersurvey2013.txt, 
archived at http://perma.cc/5PPN-GSBL. 
162 Delgado, supra note 149, at 477–78 (citations omitted). 
163 Walker & Cavenar, supra note 150, at 176. 
164 Delgado, supra note 149, at 505 (citation omitted); see, e.g., United States v. 
Whitehead, 896 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1990); Lowery v. Cummings, No. 
3:05CV303/LAC/MD, 2006 WL 2361929, at *16 (N.D. Fla. July 17, 2006), aff’d, 255 F. 
App’x 409 (11th Cir. 2007); Commonweath v. Delaney, 616 N.E.2d 111, 115–16 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1993); State v. Simonson, 669 P.2d 1092, 1097 (N.M. 1983); People v. Lockett, 
468 N.Y.S.2d 802, 804 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1983). 
165 Delgado, supra note 149, at 505 n.227 (citation omitted). 
166  Grey, supra note 65, at 104; see infra notes 189–190. On the new uses of 
neuroscience in criminal law in general, see, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “And I See Through 
Your Brain”: Access to Experts, Competency to Consent, and the Impact of Antipsychotic 
Medications in Neuroimaging Cases in the Criminal Trial Process, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 4; Michael L. Perlin & Valerie McClain, Unasked (and Unanswered) Questions About 
the Role of Neuroimaging in the Criminal Trial Process, 28 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 
5 (2009); Perlin & Lynch, supra note 26. 
167 People v. Scharf, No. C074251, 2014 WL 1316683, at *3–4 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 
2014) (holding that the jury was allowed to consider testimony regarding defendant’s PTSD 
and his treatment at the VA); State v. Walker, 235 P.3d 766, 770 (Utah Ct. App. 2010) 
(holding that the failure to call an expert was not prejudicial because the expert was not 
essential to the defendant’s case). 
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counsel to pursue a PTSD defense did not deny effective assistance of counsel.168 
Also, they have narrowly ruled on the scope of expert witnesses who may 
permissibly testify as to the syndrome’s effects.169 In one of the most poignant 
examples, a jury explained to a trial judge why it rejected an insanity defense plea 
in the case of a Vietnam veteran charged with murder: 
 
We, the Jury, recognize the contribution of our Viet Nam veterans and 
those who lost their lives in Viet Nam. We feel that the trial of Wayne 
Felde has brought to the forefront those extreme stress disorders prevalent 
among thousands of our veterans. . . . Through long and careful 
deliberation, through exposure to all evidence, we felt that Mr. Felde was 
aware of right and wrong when Mr. Thompkins’ life was taken. However, 
we pledge ourselves to contribute whatever we can to best meet the needs 
of our veterans.170 
 
In a few cases, however, the district courts’ exclusion of PTSD testimony has 
led to reversals or remands. 171  Some defendants have been successful in their 
                                                     
168 Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended Aug. 27, 
1998, (finding that counsel was not ineffective for not consulting with PTSD experts or 
presenting a PTSD defense); Miller v. State, 338 N.W. 2d 673, 678 (S.D. 1983) 
(characterizing Vietnam stress syndrome as a “novel theory of defense” which need not be 
explored by counsel). But see id. at 682 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (“The post-conviction 
judge refused to recognize, in his entire review of this case, Vietnam stress syndrome as a 
mental illness factor. Conclusion of Law number 5 states: ‘The entire record as presented to 
this court fails to present a sufficient evidentiary basis to support a mental illness defense.’ 
With this conclusion, I take exception and would hold that it is clearly erroneous.”). On the 
adequacy or inadequacy of counsel in cases involving mentally disabled defendants facing 
the death penalty, see MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: 
THE SHAME OF THE STATES 123–38 (2013). 
169 United States v. Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1076–77 (5th Cir. 1983). 
170 State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 380 n.9 (La. 1982); see also Aprilakis, supra note 
152, at 565 (“Felde suggests that where violent crime is alleged, a jury will be hesitant or 
perhaps unwilling to find a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity if there is any 
possibility the defendant will be free to recreate his crime.” (emphasis added)). 
171 See, e.g., United States v. Rezaq, 918 F. Supp. 463, 467–68 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding 
that reports by defendant’s experts indicated defendant’s diagnosis of PTSD satisfied 
insanity test); State v. White, 943 P.2d 544, 545 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that exclusion 
of testimony about PTSD manifestations was reversible error); State v. Phipps, 883 S.W.2d 
138, 143 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 959 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. 1997) 
(reversing conviction where court refused to instruct jury that PTSD evidence could be 
considered in determining whether defendant had specific intent necessary for first-degree 
murder conviction). But see Lambright v. Schriro, 485 F.3d 512 (9th Cir.), amended and 
superseded on denial of reh’g, 490 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2007) (remanding the case on 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to investigate and present evidence on 
PTSD); Morgan v. Krenke, 72 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1020 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (holding that 
wholesale exclusion of relevant testimony on PTSD in guilt phase violated defendant’s fair 
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arguments that evidence of PTSD should be admissible at sentencing;172 however, a 
student author has concluded the courts’ decisions in admitting the evidence appear 
to be based on “the nature of the crime itself and the individual defendant’s success 
at rehabilitation,” rather than the underlying syndrome.173  
Interestingly, the Supreme Court has relatively recently ruled in a death penalty 
case that attorneys are required to present evidence of PTSD when it is available.174 
There, although the defendant had been a decorated Korean War veteran, his court-
appointed counsel presented no evidence whatsoever of his military service to the 
jury.175 The Court noted that, had such evidence been presented, the jury might have 
found mitigating “the intense stress and mental and emotional toll that combat took 
on Porter.”176 The Court added, in especially relevant language, “Our Nation has a 
long tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of their service, 
especially for those who fought on the front lines as Porter did.”177 
“Veterans who suffer from PTSD may face criminal charges because the 
symptoms that they suffer from can consequently lead them to commit criminal 
offenses,” 178 and it has been noted that “[t]he relationship between PTSD and 
criminal offending is considered to be so significant that the president of the National 
Veterans Federation . . . warns that the criminal justice system is facing an epidemic 
of veterans with PTSD being charged with crimes.”179 This relationship is “well-
                                                     
trial rights), rev’d, 232 F.3d 562, 569 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that exclusion of expert 
opinion testimony on ultimate issue of capacity to form intent in guilt phase did not deprive 
petitioner of her due process right to present a defense). 
172 See, e.g., State v. Spawr, 653 S.W.2d 404, 405–06 (Tenn. 1983). But see State v. 
Watson, 316 S.E.2d 293, 296 (N.C. 1984) (“The evidence is both conflicting and 
inconclusive with respect to any connection.”); see also Styers v. Ryan, No. CV-98-2244-
PHX-JAT, 2013 WL 1149919, at *22 (D. Ariz. Mar. 20, 2013) (giving little weight to PTSD 
as a mitigating factor); State v. Sullivan, 695 A.2d 115, 116–17 (Me. 1997) (holding that 
defendant was deprived of a fair trial because the jury was not instructed to consider self-
defense because of his PTSD); State v. Petit, 661 P.2d 767, 769 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (“His 
claim of a post-traumatic stress disorder also may merit further clinical evaluation.”); 
Brotherton, supra note 142, at 91 n.1 (listing unreported cases in which PTSD asserted as a 
sentence-mitigation factor). 
173 Delgado, supra note 149, at 503. 
174 Porter v. McCullum, 558 U.S. 30, 42–44 (2009) (per curiam) (holding that evidence 
must be presented when it would balance the sides of mitigating for and mitigating against). 
175 Id. at 43. 
176 Id. at 44. 
177 Id. at 43. I discuss this case in this context in Perlin, John Brown Went Off to War, 
supra note 6, at 462. 
178 Jillian M. Cavanaugh, Helping Those Who Serve: Veterans Treatment Courts Foster 
Rehabilitation and Reduce Recidivism for Offending Combat Veterans, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
463, 468 (2011). 
179 Melissa Hamilton, Reinvigorating Actus Reus: The Case for Involuntary Actions by 
Veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 340, 341 (2011). 
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recognized by researchers and psychologists,”180 and, increasingly, by the courts.181 
The question then is this: To what extent will considering PTSD diagnosis as a 
mitigating factor during sentencing change with the adoption of DSM-5? 
 
IV.  DSM-5 
 
Scholars of forensic psychiatry have been quick to label this version of the 
DSM as being of “immense importance to the mental health professions,”182 and of 
“particular importance to forensic psychiatrists”183 and forensic psychologists.184 
The new version of DSM markedly expands the definition of PTSD, and lists these 
five criteria: 
 
A. Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual 
violence . . . .  
B. Presence of one (or more) . . . intrusion symptoms associated with the 
traumatic event(s) . . . .  
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the traumatic event(s) . 
. . .  
D. Negative alterations in cognitions and mood associated with the 
traumatic event(s) . . . . 
E. Marked alterations in arousal and reactivity associated with the 
traumatic event(s) . . . . 185 
 
These criteria must be met for at least one month, and, in the case of “delayed 
expression,” criteria may not be met for six months after the event.186 The previous 
requirement of the DSM IV-R that “the person’s response involved intense fear, 
                                                     
180 Samantha Walls, The Need for Special Veterans Courts, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 695, 712 (2011). 
181 Id. at 712, n.159 (citing Erin M. Gover, Iraq as a Psychological Quagmire: The 
Implications of Using Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a Defense for Iraq War Veterans, 
28 PACE L. REV. 561, 562–63, 570–81 (2008)). 
182 Paul S. Appelbaum, Commentary: DSM-5 and Forensic Psychiatry, 42 J. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 136, 136 (2014). 
183 Wills & Gold, supra note 17, at 132. 
184  See generally Kristine M. Jacquin, Changes in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders that Impact Forensic Psychology (March 2014) (paper 
presented to the American College of Forensic Psychology) (on file with author). 
185 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 17, at 271–72. On the significance of 
the symptom clusters and the retained inclusion of a “delayed-onset” specifier in DSM-5, 
see Levin et al., supra note 16, at 150–51. On the significance of delayed-onset PTSD in 
cases not involving soldiers in combat, see, e.g., Matt J. Gray et al., A Longitudinal Analysis 
of PTSD Symptom Course: Delayed-Onset PTSD in Somalia Peacekeepers, 72 J. 
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 909 (2004). 
186 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 17, at 272. 
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helplessness, or horror”187 has been eliminated. Now, predisposing and postevent 
factors “play a significant role” in the development of PTSD.188 
Although there has traditionally been skepticism about cases involving PTSD, 
“especially because assessing the disorder involves in large part a self-report by the 
person seeking treatment,” 189  more recent research has revealed that certain 
psychophysiological testing involving measurement of facial electromyograms, 
heart rate, and skin conductance were statistically significant, and thus concluded 
that PTSD was “clearly associated with altered psychophysiological measures as 
compared with non-affected individuals.”190 
 
V.  THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE191 
 
One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past two 
decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic jurisprudence 
(TJ).192 TJ theories were initially employed in cases involving individuals with 
mental disabilities, but they have been subsequently expanded far beyond that 
narrow area. TJ presents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and 
                                                     
187 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV, supra note 143, at 428. 
188 Levin et al., supra note 16, at 148. 
189 Craig M. Kabatchnick, PTSD and Its Effects on Elderly, Minority, and Female 
Veterans of All Wars, 10 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 269, 299 (2009). See also supra notes 
164–165 and accompanying text. 
190 Mark B. Hammer, The Role of PTSD in Adjudicating Violent Crimes, 42 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 155, 158 (2014). 
191 This section is generally adapted from Perlin & Lynch, supra note 26; Perlin, supra 
note 115; and Michael L. Perlin, “Yonder Stands Your Orphan with His Gun”: The 
International Human Rights and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Implications of Juvenile 
Punishment Schemes, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 301 (2013); see also, Michael L. Perlin & 
Meredith R. Schriver, “You That Hide Behind Walls”: The Relationship Between the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Convention Against Torture 
and the Treatment of Institutionalized Forensic Patients, in TORTURE IN HEALTHCARE 
SETTINGS: REFLECTIONS ON THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON TORTURE’S 2013 THEMATIC 
REPORT 195 (2014); 
192  See, e.g., PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 2, § 2D-3, at 534–41; 
DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN 
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, at xvii (1996); DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC 
JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL 
COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 154–62 (2005); David B. Wexler, 
Two Decades of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17, 17 (2008). Professor 
Wexler first used the term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health 
in 1987. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27, 32–33 (1992) (defining therapeutic 
jurisprudence as “the study of the role of the law as a therapeutic agent” and discussing its 
task and scope). 
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legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law that can have therapeutic 
or antitherapeutic consequences.193  
 
A.  Therapeutic Jurisprudence Defined 
 
The ultimate aim of TJ is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and 
lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential without 
subordinating due process principles.194 There is an inherent tension in this inquiry, 
but Professor David Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: the law’s use 
of “mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] imping[e] 
upon justice concerns.”195 Importantly, “[a]n inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does 
not mean that therapeutic concerns ‘trump’ civil rights and civil liberties.”196 
TJ “asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people’s lives”197 and focuses 
on the law’s influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.198 It suggests 
that “law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-
therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when consistent with other values 
                                                     
193 See Perlin, His Brain, supra note 32, at 912; see also Diesfeld & Freckelton, supra 
note 36, at 97–108 (providing a transnational perspective). 
194 Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve 
Got”: The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 735, 751 (2005); Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else 
Expecting Rain”: Considering the Sexual Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized 
Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 510 
n.139 (2008). On how therapeutic jurisprudence “might be a redemptive tool in efforts to 
combat sanism, as a means of ‘strip[ping] bare the law’s sanist façade,’” see Perlin, Baby, 
Look Inside Your Mirror, supra note 30, at 591 (quoting, in part, PERLIN, HIDDEN PREJUDICE, 
supra note 47, at 301). See also Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood 
and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575, 585–
86 (2008); Bernard P. Perlmutter, George’s Story: Voice and Transformation Through the 
Teaching and Practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Law School Child Advocacy Clinic, 
17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 561, 599 n.111 (2005) (describing lessons on “how to avoid 
succumbing to paternalistic attitudes and disempowering practices in representing . . . 
clients”). 
195 David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal 
Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 17, 21 (1993); see also David B. Wexler, Applying the 
Law Therapeutically, 5 APPLIED & PREVENTATIVE PSYCHOL. 179 (1996) (explaining that 
psychologists “can suggest reforms in the law that would serve justice and yet better promote 
mental health”). 
196 Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412 (2000); Michael 
L. Perlin, “Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline”: Mental Disability Law, Theory 
and Practice, “Us” and “Them”, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998). 
197 Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing 
with Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009). 
198 David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft Spots 
and Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING 
PROFESSION 45, 45 (Dennis P. Stolle et al. eds., 2000). 
920 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
served by law, should attempt to bring about healing and wellness.”199 “TJ seeks to 
inform lawyering practices and influence policy ‘by using social science data and 
methodology to study the extent to which a legal rule, procedure, or practice 
promotes the psychological and physical well-being of the people it affects.’”200   
TJ “is a tool for gaining a new and distinctive perspective utilizing socio-
psychological insights into the law and its applications.”201  It is also part of a 
growing comprehensive movement in the law towards establishing more humane 
and psychologically optimal ways of handling legal issues collaboratively, 
creatively, and respectfully.202 In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, 
enhance rights, and promote well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence has been 
described as “a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of law . . . a movement 
towards a more distinctly relational approach to the practice of law. . . . which 
emphasise psychological wellness over adversarial triumphalism.”203 That is, TJ 
supports an ethic of care.204 
                                                     
199  Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Commitment, in 
INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003). 
200 Perlin & Lynch, supra note 36, manuscript at 48 (quoting Keri K. Gould & Michael 
L. Perlin, “Johnny’s in the Basement/Mixing up his Medicine”: Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
& Clinical Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339, 353–54 (2000)). See also Christopher 
Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 193, 197 (1995) (stating TJ “adopt[s] a preference for laws that promote well-being”). 
201 Diesfeld & Freckelton, supra note 36, at 576. 
202 Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within the Comprehensive 
Law Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING 
PROFESSION, supra note 198, at 465. 
203  Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical 
Framework, 8 J.L. & MED. 328, 329–30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming 
Psychological Barriers to Settlement: Challenges for the TJ Lawyer, in THE AFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 342 (Marjorie A. 
Silver ed., 2006) (exploring the role of a lawyer representing a client and their role as a 
therapeutic agent); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law Clinic, 13 
CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605–06 (2006) (describing how TJ can be used in legal education and 
practice). The concept of the “relational approach” dates to CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A 
DIFFERENT VOICE 24–32 (1982). 
204 Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A “Therapeutic” Approach 
to Enriching Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 
(2006); Brookbanks, supra note 203, at 328–30, 333–35; David B. Wexler, Not Such a Party 
Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) Professor Quinn’s Concerns About 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007); 
Winick & Wexler, supra note 203, at 605–07.  
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One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity.205 Professor 
Amy Ronner illustrates this central principle as the “three Vs”: voice, validation and 
voluntariness.206 She argues,  
 
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense 
of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If that litigant 
feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously 
the litigant’s story, the litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants 
emerge from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they 
are more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create a sense 
of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant experiences the 
proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the feeling on the part of litigants 
that they voluntarily partook in the very process that engendered the end 
result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects their own lives can 
initiate healing and bring about improved behavior in the future. In 
general, human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at 
least participating in, their own decisions.207 
 
B.  Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Sentencing of PTSD Defendants 
 
The question to be posed here is this: to what extent do our criminal sentencing 
practices in cases of defendants with PTSD comport with TJ principles?208 To what 
extent do they comply with Professor Ronner’s aspirations that the “three V’s” be 
present in all matters? To what extent can TJ be better applied to sentencing 
decisions in the cases of veteran defendants with PTSD? 
One of the basic premises of TJ is that “a rigid, inflexible sentencing scheme, 
especially one characterized by mandatory incarcerative penalties” is 
antitherapeutic. 209  Former Magistrate Michael King has underscored that a TJ 
                                                     
205  See PERLIN, PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY, supra note 38, at 214–15 (discussing 
dignity in the sentencing process generally); WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT, supra note 192, 
at 161 (2005).  
206 Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 
(2008); see also Freckelton, supra note 194, at 588 (addressing the importance of “voice”). 
207  Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 89, 94–95 (2002); 
see also AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE, AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 23–24 
(2010) (explaining the “three Vs” and the importance of participation in the decision-making 
process). 
208 PERLIN, PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY, supra note 38, at 212–14 (discussing the role 
of procedural justice and restorative justice in the sentencing context). 
209  David B. Wexler, A Tripartite Framework for Incorporating Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence in Criminal Law Education, Research, and Practice, in REHABILITATING 
LAWYERS: PRINCIPLES OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE FOR CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE 11, 
15 (David B. Wexler ed., 2008) [hereinafter REHABILITATING LAWYERS]; see also David B. 
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approach towards criminal defense practice “is changing the dynamics of 
courtrooms, particularly in the context of sentencing.”210 The late Professor Bruce 
Winick wrote extensively about the need for criminal defense lawyers to rethink 
their traditional roles at sentencing and to infuse their work with a significant 
measure of TJ, urging them to seek judicial enforcement of “relapse prevention 
methods,” involving the “fashioning of creative community alternatives.”211  
Professor Winick focused on the case of United States v. Flowers,212 in which 
District Court Judge Jack Weinstein recognized “that sentencing judges enjoy broad 
discretion to postpone or defer sentencing in appropriate cases in order to allow the 
defendant to commence a rehabilitative program that, if successful, might provide 
the basis for a downward departure” from the Sentencing Guidelines.213 Embracing 
TJ principles, Professor Winick continued, requires new visions on the part of 
defense attorneys: 
 
Not only do these attorneys need to develop new skills, but they need to 
think of themselves in new ways. They need to understand the vocabulary 
and techniques of these new rehabilitative approaches. They need to 
develop techniques for dealing with their clients about the issue of 
rehabilitation with a higher degree of psychological sensitivity. They need 
to understand that, whether they know it or not, they are functioning as 
therapeutic agents in their interactions with their clients, particularly in the 
                                                     
Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Family-Friendly Criminal Law Practice, 17 BARRY 
L. REV. 7, 8 (2011) (examining TJ in the criminal law system from a family-sensitive point 
of view). The text accompanying notes 208–213 is generally adapted from PERLIN, 
PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY, supra note 38, at 210–12. 
210 Michael S. King, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Criminal Law Practice, and the Plea 
of Guilty, in REHABILITATING LAWYERS, supra note 209, at 230, 238. 
211 Bruce J. Winick, Redefining the Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer at Plea 
Bargaining and Sentencing: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventive Law Model, 5 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 1034, 1036 (1999). 
212 983 F. Supp. 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
213 Winick, supra note 211, at 1037 (discussing Flowers, 983 F. Supp. at 163); see also 
Michael Crystal, The Therapeutic Sentence: Chicken Soup for an Ailing Criminal Court, in 
REHABILITATING LAWYERS, supra note 209, at 183, 184 (discussing the multiple stages of 
the “construction of a TJ sentence”); Robert Ward, Criminal Defense Practice and 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Zealous Advocacy Through Zealous Counseling: Perspectives, 
Plans and Policy, in REHABILITATING LAWYERS, supra note 209, at 206, 206–07 (discussing 
the “value in welcoming the perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence in . . . sentencing 
advocacy”). Paul Marcus and Vicki Waye have pointed out other benefits of an 
individualized sentencing approach: “The retention of judicial discretion enables the 
sentencing judge to take account of the offender’s personal situation and the circumstances 
of the offending, encourages guilty pleas to appropriate charges, and enables a creative and 
customized sentence more likely to incorporate therapeutic or restorative elements.” Vicki 
Waye & Paul Marcus, Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice 
Systems Uncommonly at Odds, Part 2, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 335, 399 (2010). 
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plea and sentencing process. They need to recognize the opportunities that 
these new developments provide to offer new modes of assistance to their 
clients that can promote both their interests in maintaining their liberty and 
in achieving a higher degree of psychological well-being.214 
 
Interestingly, while there is robust TJ literature on the question of criminal 
sentencing in general,215 and while there has been some preliminary work on the 
implications of the potential use of veterans courts as a means of diverting some 
cases involving veterans from the “regular” criminal justice system216 and on the 
dramatically-under-considered question of where prisoners with serious mental 
disabilities should be housed,217 there is little in the specific context of PTSD. Major 
Evan Seamone has done—and continues to do—a heroic job of articulating how and 
why TJ should be employed in cases involving the prosecution of individuals in the 
                                                     
214 Winick, supra note 211, at 1038. 
215 E.g., Dana Segev, The TJ Mainstreaming Project: An Evaluation of the Israeli Youth 
Act, 7 ARIZ. SUMMIT L. REV. 527 (2014); David B. Wexler, Adding Color to the White Paper: 
Time for a Robust Reciprocal Relationship Between Procedural Justice and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 44 CT. REV. 78 (2008); David B. Wexler, New Wine in New Bottles: The 
Need to Sketch a Therapeutic Jurisprudence “Code” of Proposed Criminal Processes and 
Practices, 7 ARIZ. SUMMIT L. REV. 463 (2014) [hereinafter Wexler, New Wine]; David B. 
Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Legal Landscapes, and Form Reform: The Case of 
Diversion, 10 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 361 (2009). Professor Wexler is clear that U.S. 
sentencing practices are often antithetical to TJ aspirations. See Wexler, New Wine, supra at 
470–75; Wexler, A Tripartite Framework, supra note 209, at 96–102. 
216 E.g., Julie Marie Baldwin & Joseph Rukus, Healing the Wounds: An Examination 
of Veterans Treatment Courts in the Context of Restorative Justice, 26 CRIM. J. POL’Y REV. 
183 (2014); Perlin, John Brown Went Off to War, supra note 6. 
217  
At sentencing, a judge can often foresee that an individual, because of his 
major mental disorder and other vulnerabilities, will experience serious 
psychological or physical harm in prison. These harms may include psychological 
deterioration and mental distress, attempted suicide, and victimization by staff or 
other inmates. In response, some jurisdictions allow a judge to commit a 
disordered offender for treatment in lieu of incarceration, and others designate the 
defendant’s need for treatment and likely undue hardship in prison as mitigating 
factors at sentencing. However, these measures do not go far enough to protect 
vulnerable prisoners. To prevent anticipated and unjust harms, legislatures should 
authorize judges to tailor the conditions of vulnerable, disordered offenders’ 
sentences when specific conditions of confinement are integral to the judge’s 
sentencing aims or the humaneness of the punishment. Under one possible model, 
if correctional officials find a condition to be inappropriate, unnecessary, or 
infeasible, the government could move to reopen the sentence. 
 
E. Lea Johnston, Conditions of Confinement at Sentencing: The Case of Seriously 
Disordered Offenders, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 625, 676–77 (2014). 
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military whose criminality may be related to PTSD.218 But, other than his work, the 
literature is scant.219 Consider the range of questions a TJ-savvy lawyer should ask 
about this matter: 
 
 What was the defendant’s experience in the war? For how long was the 
defendant in a combat zone? Or in a zone of danger? Had the defendant 
ever been fired upon? Had the defendant fired their weapon? What were 
the results?  
 Did the defendant ever see anyone killed? If yes, was that person someone 
the defendant knew or knew well? Or share a barracks or tent with? Was 
this death the result of a gunshot, an explosion, or something else? 
 Which of the criteria in DSM-5 does the defendant meet? How have these 
criteria been manifested? 
 (In those jurisdictions in which sentencing guidelines similar to the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines apply) To what extent did the defendant’s war 
service have an impact on the purposes of and rationales for punishment so 
as to “reflect the basic aims of sentencing”?220 
 Is the case in question being heard in a traditional criminal court or a 
Veterans Court? If the latter, how is it equipped to deal with PTSD cases? 
                                                     
218  See, e.g., Evan R. Seamone, Attorneys as First-Responders: Recognizing the 
Destructive Nature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder on the Combat Veteran’s Legal 
Decision-Making Process, 202 MIL. L. REV. 144, 145–48 (2009); Evan Seamone, 
Dismantling America’s Largest Sleeper Cell: The Imperative to Treat, Rather Than Merely 
Punish, Active Duty Offenders with PTSD Prior to Discharge from the Armed Forces, 37 
NOVA L. REV. 479, 485 (2013); Evan R. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in 
Military Justice: The Suspended Punitive Discharge as a Method to Treat Military Offenders 
with PTSD and TBI and Reduce Recidivism, 208 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011); Evan R. Seamone, 
The Veterans’ Lawyer as Counselor: Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence to Enhance Client 
Counseling for Combat Veterans with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 202 MIL. L. REV. 185, 
186–88 (2009). 
219  See Wieand, supra note 65, 258–59 (citing David B. Wexler, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence: An Overview, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 125, 132 (2000)) (“The judge’s 
discussion with the veteran about the root cause of his criminal activity and combat trauma 
parallels the idea of a broad and open guilty plea colloquy. This type of cognitive behavioral 
treatment allows a judge to dig out and make aware to the veteran the chain of events that 
brought him to court, and encourages him to stop and think in advance ‘when similar 
situations arise.’ Through this process, the veterans treatment court serves as a “reasoning 
and rehabilitation” program that in combination with mental health services can help 
veterans unearth the sources of their criminal activity and readjust their lifestyle to avoid 
potential recurrence of their criminal activity.”); see also id. at 257–61 (relying on the work 
of TJ “founder” David Wexler, in endorsing the creation of “behavioral contracts” to provide 
guidance for treatment of the cognitive disorders of offenders). 
220 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–48 (2007) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 
This is discussed in the supra text note 93. 
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 How does the diagnosis of PTSD affect the defendant’s ability to “absorb 
information and reason” in the defendant’s daily life? 
 Was the PTSD diagnosis (and any resulting treatment) found when the 
defendant was still in the service, when he returned home, or after he was 
arrested for the crime in question? If it manifested when the defendant was 
in the service, was the defendant treated in the service for it? What sort of 
treatment? What were the results of that treatment? 
 Was the defendant exhibiting symptoms of PTSD at the time of the alleged 
crime? 
 Are there alternative dispositional possibilities that, consonant with safety 
and security issues, would result in meaningful treatment for the 
defendant’s PTSD? 
 Are lawyers fulfilling the mandate sketched out fifteen years ago by 
Professor Winick (have they developed techniques for dealing with their 
clients about the issue of rehabilitation with a higher degree of 
psychological sensitivity)?221 
 
I believe all actors in the criminal justice systems, military and civilian—
defense counsel, government attorneys, and judges—need to familiarize themselves 
with the basic TJ concepts so that they can incorporate TJ principles in their 
representation, prosecution, and adjudication decisions. I believe that if lawyers 
incorporated these questions into their interviewing and counseling processes, this 
would lead to case strategizing that would more comport with the spirit and letter of 
TJ and result in a situation more consonant with what Professor Ronner discusses in 
her writings, referred to above.222  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Given the limited definition of PTSD in earlier versions of DSM, the pernicious 
roles of sanism and OCS, and judges’ reluctance to embrace mental disability as a 
mitigator within the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, PTSD diagnoses have had little 
positive impact on the criminal sentencing process. The expanded definition of 
PTSD in DSM-5 may have profound effects on all criminal sentencing. By 
expanding the range of symptom clusters, 223  DSM-5 makes more defendants 
                                                     
221 Winick, supra note 211, at 1038. 
222 Ronner, supra note 207. I suggest a parallel set of questions for lawyers representing 
individuals in incompetency hearings and insanity defense trials in Michael L. Perlin, “Too 
Stubborn To Ever Be Governed By Enforced Insanity”: Some Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Dilemmas in the Representation of Criminal Defendants in Incompetency and Insanity 
Cases, 33 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 475 (2010). 
223 Levin et al., supra note 16, at 147–48. 
926 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
“eligible” to seek sentence reductions based on the 2011 amendments to the 
Guidelines224 and the statutory criteria for such reduction.225 
As discussed earlier, courts have not been overwhelmingly receptive to PTSD-
based arguments, whether offered in support of an insanity defense or in support of 
a lesser sentence. To a significant extent, I believe, this flows from the tired and 
banal sanist myths that infect both judicial and juror behavior. Even when some 
awareness is shown, it is often as a coda to a decision that, basically, ignores the 
diagnostic realities. The jurors’ statement in Felde 226  and the Supreme Court’s 
language in Porter v. McCollum227 both tell us we still fail to acknowledge the reality 
of mental illness in this context. 
A serious and critical focus on DSM-5’s expanded PTSD definition—through 
a TJ filter—gives us some hope for the future and makes it more likely that sanist 
decision-making may be reduced. This aspiration, though, is contingent on multiple 
factors: 
 
1. Courts must “get” the significance of the expanded PTSD definition in 
DSM-5.228 
2. Fact finders must understand how experiences of soldiers in current wars 
may have been dramatically different from what their “ordinary common 
sense”229 has led them to believe is how soldiers “should have reacted” to 
battlefield conditions. 
3. Fact finders must, finally, acknowledge how sanist thinking has distorted 
their decision-making in this area.230 
4. Fact finders must embrace TJ as a “redemptive” means of “stripping bare 
the law’s sanist façade” of such decision-making.231 
5. Lawyers need to understand the vocabulary and techniques of these new 
rehabilitative approaches.232 They must ask the questions listed in the prior 
                                                     
224 Grey, supra note 65, at 61; see supra text accompanying notes 65–78. 
225 Rita, 551 U.S. at 347–48; see supra text accompanying note 93. 
226 State v. Felde, 422 So. 2d 370, 380 n.9 (La. 1982); see supra text accompanying 
170. 
227 “Our Nation has a long tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of 
their service, especially for those who fought on the front lines as Porter did.” 558 U.S. 30, 
43 (2009); see supra text accompanying notes 174–181. 
228 As of the time this Article was written (October 2014), there have been only two 
reported cases that considered PTSD in the context of DSM-5, and both of those were VA 
benefit claims cases: Creech v. Astrue, No. 2:12-cv-0591, 2013 WL 5182848 (S.D. Ohio 
Sept. 13, 2013) and Bunton v. Shinseki, No. 12-1869, 2013 WL 3934225 (Ct. App. Vets. 
Claims July 31, 2013). 
229 See supra text accompanying notes 113–115. 
230 Perlin & Gould, supra note 29, at 442–47. 
231 Perlin, Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror, supra note 30, at 591. 
232 Winick, supra note 211, at 1038. 
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section and consider incorporating their clients’ answers into their 
advocacy strategies. 
6. Judges, lawyers and all those who interact with the criminal justice system 
or defendants with PTSD need to understand the true consequences of 
failing to acknowledge the impact of PTSD, and the contingent benefits—
as to lowering recidivism rates, enhancing behavioral changes—of actually 
incorporating the PTSD issues.  
 
These changes would all more firmly ground this entire process in the “real 
life” consequences and benefits of embracing therapeutic jurisprudence, beyond 
simply questions of theory. They would optimally ensure that the judicial process 
acknowledges the scope of the underlying issues and consequently adjust sentencing 
practices to comply with these insights. If and only if, we begin to incorporate these 
perspectives can we expect there to be any genuine ameliorative change in this area 
of law and social policy.  
Bob Dylan’s song, Stuck Inside of Mobile, seeks to sort out “hallucinations, 
reality, experiences, allusions and delusions.” 233  My sense is that many of the 
defendants before the courts in the cases cited in this article have experienced all of 
these perceptions since their return from the wars. My hopes are that we will take 
seriously the insights into the roots of behavior that are contained in this new section 
of DSM-5 and begin to treat war veterans with the dignity234 to which they are 
entitled. 
                                                     
233 OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
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234 PERLIN, PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY, supra note 38; Perlin, Gates of Eden, supra 
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